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ABSTRACT 
Large-scale conventional wars have become quite rare, yet most militaries are built with 
this model in mind. Conversely, less well-resourced entities employ force through part-
time fighters and prevail at a higher rate than expected when facing standing militaries; in 
these cases, they employ pre-existing combat-related skills mastered either in civilian life 
or through military refresher courses. This research seeks to determine whether a militia-
focused approach may be the most cost-effective security choice for a community; it may 
not be optimal for short, blitzkrieg-like engagements, but it may employ force effectively 
for defending the community it represents. Through analyzing three historical cases that 
stretch from small-scale to nationwide war, from desert to forested mountains, from 
unconventional to mechanized warfare, and from active combat to pure successful 
deterrence, this thesis examines the conditions under which a militia-based defense 
system is a viable and attractive option for national defense. 
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Large-scale conventional wars have become quite rare, yet most militaries are 
built with this model in mind. Land, air, and maritime forces are constantly upgraded and 
maintained; massively expensive conventional fighting equipment is developed, and 
decades later, it becomes aged and obsolete. Conversely, less well-resourced entities 
pursue their interests by employing force through part-time fighters, lightly equipped and 
poorly organized, from a conventional perspective. Yet, when facing each other, the 
irregulars1 prevail at a higher rate than expected.2 
The most recent examples are the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. Despite the 
stunning initial victories over the conventionally-oriented defense structures of the 
invaded countries, the United States military (fighting on its own or leading a coalition) 
experienced long and difficult engagements during the stabilization phase in both theaters 
of operations; the high-quality professional forces became impotent mastodons and an 
opportunity target for the more versatile and cost-effective militias they faced. Moreover, 
the Syrian governmental forces regained the initiative against the rebels only after 
Hezbollah fighters joined the war on the Assad regime’s side. With these examples in 
mind, corroborated by the prevalence of irregular warfare across the spectrum of armed 
conflict since the last world war, one can observe that professional militaries may not be 
the optimal investment for national security; perhaps it is the case that these militaries 
have become irrelevant for the conflicts of the third millennium,3 or at least an 
organizational structure that is ill-fitted to the current threat environment. 
1 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York : 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1. 
2 Patricia L. Sullivan, Who Wins? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), i. 
3 Martin L. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York and Toronto: Free Press, 1991), ii. 
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B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
The scope of this thesis extends to analyzing the outputs that militia structures can 
offer for the systems of which they are a part, in order to determine the degree to which 
they may be a viable option for a nation-state’s defense system. An analysis of a selection 
of performances of militia forces over the last three centuries in major conflicts and 
smaller interventions should allow us to identify the conditions under which part-time 
militaries can be successfully employed, and furthermore provide valuable advantages for 
developing defense strategies. 
Correctly defined, these conditions should play an important role in shaping the 
organization and training cycle of the armed forces. This thesis will cover the strategic 
utility of militias, both in defensive wars against foreign threat/occupation and in 
expeditionary military actions abroad. 
C. CORE ARGUMENT 
The main research question of the thesis asks whether a militia-focused approach 
may be the most cost-effective defense/security choice for a community; is it a viable 
option for short, conventional, small-scale engagements? Can a militia-based approach 
defend the community it represents and promote its interests? This thesis will seek to find 
whether militia organizations identify with the community, and what is the relationship 
that eases the mutual support between the two; is there any ideology enforcing it? 
This research will also try to reveal the most significant factors that directly affect 
the performance of the militia in combat; is it a matter of superior skills, superior 
technologies and equipment, or better tactics? Is it related to the nature of the potential 
conflict (that is offensive or defensive, violent or non-violent, kinetic or non-kinetic), and 
will militiamen eagerly engage in conflict-related activities, inside or outside the 
geographical borders of the community? Finally, the relevance of a centralized command, 
control, and support system related to the individual and collective performance of the 
militiamen and militia organizations will be investigated. 
 2 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodological contributions of this project are two-fold. The first is to 
develop the concept of “militia” more rigorously than has been done previously. This 
often neglected task is important for building the conceptual foundation of any social 
science study.4 The second is to test some exploratory propositions about militias using 
the qualitative method of structured-focused comparison.5 
First, the hub-and-spoke nature of the militia concept is developed in Chapter II. 
The essentialist hub is the non-professional character of the forces, and the radial 
components are the national-level subordination (central command); state-sponsored 
training, manning, and equipping; the level of efficiency achieved through the usage of 
pre-existing skills; and the ideology driving the militiamen. All the spokes are allowed to 
vary or are set constant, case by case, and they cause variance on the dependent variable, 
as shown in the final chapter.6  
Further, the cases span both conventional and unconventional warfare, so as to be 
relevant for current national security needs. Based on this profile, the performance of 
three militia-based military structures qualified as appropriate case studies: the American 
Rebels from the Revolutionary War, in particular the “over mountain men” of the King’s 
Mountain battle, which is a case of guerrillas directly engaging a conventional Redcoat 
militia; the Israeli Defense Force, which emerged from an underground movement into 
what is considered today the most competent military in the Middle East, particularly in 
regards to mechanized warfare; and the Swiss military, which evolved from the 
laboratory that created the world’s most feared mercenaries in the fifteenth century, into 
what is today known as the warrant of seven centuries of peace in the Federation of the 
Alps’ Cantons. 
4 Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2006), ii. 
5 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 67. 
6 Gary Goertz, Increasing Concept-Indicator Validity: The Case of Democracy (Tucson, AZ: 
University of Arizona, Department of Political Science, unpublished working paper), 10‒12. 
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The correlation between the efficiency/inefficiency of the forces with respect to 
their purpose and the independent variables in place will be established through the 
method of structured-focused comparison.7 By analyzing the fitness of the militias in the 
environment, their formal organization, and the nature of the threats they faced, we 
expect to find specific characteristics that lead to success or failure. At the same time, the 
studies should also identify the features that did not influence the outcomes of the 
conflict. 
E. THESIS OUTLINE 
In the next chapter the concept of militia-based defense systems is introduced, and 
the case studies and the rationale for selecting them are presented. 
Chapter III presents the battle of King’s Mountain during the American 
Revolution and describes the traits of the opposing forces, providing the logical 
arguments that favored the Rebel militia when facing the traditional Redcoats. 
Chapter IV is devoted to the Israeli Defense Force, from its inception until the 
political environment of the Middle East changed in favor of Israel during the 1970s. It 
presents a small nation fighting for survival in a completely hostile environment, and 
resorting to a militia-based defense system as the only way to overcome the external 
aggression and internal discontent during the phase of nation-building.  
Chapter V introduces one of the most interesting militia-based defense systems: 
the Swiss military. It shows a neutral country that (almost completely) avoided being 
involved in a military conflict for the last five centuries without having a standing army, 
as opposed to its previous historical record when they lost all of their wars, despite 
having a trained standing military. 
7 Stephen van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), 56. 
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The final chapter brings together the conclusions drawn from the case studies and 
is entirely devoted to the induction of a theory addressing the potential benefits of a 
militia-based defense system for small nations under security uncertainty. Subsequently, 
it makes recommendations for the improvement of the defense structure’s efficiency. 
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II. EFFECTIVE MILITIAS: OVERLAPPING CIVILIAN SKILLS 
AND MILITARY MISSIONS 
They all know how to shoot. They do not have to be trained how to fight in 
other environments than their own one. 
–John McPhee 
A. MILITIAS 
It is universally accepted that states need security, and this is usually provided by 
a military organization embedded in a defense system. From this point forward, a strong 
debate concerning the ways in which the military should be set begins; the central themes 
consist of missions, capabilities, roles, reserve/active forces trade-offs, and budgeting.8 
Most of the time, the resulting outcomes consist of normative statements that sometimes 
disregard the status quo of the society that should benefit from the desired security. The 
pre-existing skills and capabilities that are embedded within the population at large often 
play a marginal role or no role at all, and do not constitute one of the starting points of the 
defense planning process; thus, the common option is a traditional standing military. In 
the following chapters, close attention will be paid to the potential of militia 
organizations and citizens’ pre-existing skills as alternatives to the commonly adopted 
professional military. 
This chapter will introduce the concept of a defense-relevant militia system, in 
order to set the boundaries of the domain analyzed. Using hub-and-spoke construction, 
the next paragraph will set the primary and secondary attributes for an organization to be 
considered as militia-type. Next, the practicability of involving citizen soldiers across the 
spectrum of military operations will be addressed, followed by considerations regarding 
the need, if not the opportunity, of appealing to militia-based options as a better answer to 
national security needs. Last, the methodology used to support the claims of the thesis 
follows. 
8 Paul K. Davis, “Introduction,” in Rethinking How Much is Enough (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
1994), 3. 
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In the official defense vernacular, there is no clear definition stating the 
characteristics, roles, and capabilities of militias; rather, there are plenty of general 
descriptions of what militia should or could be, with a single thread serving as the 
“essentialist hub of the concept:”9 that is, militias do not consist of professional soldiers. 
Using Goertz’s10 concept-indicator model, militias further present a number of 
components that are defining the radial structure of the hub-and-spoke: national-level 
subordination, state-sponsored training, manning, and equipping, background conditions 
incentivizing militia members to attend the organization, and the quality of militia units 
with respect to the resources dedicated to stand them up.  
Given that the essential attribute of a militia is its non-professional nature, a 
common assumption concerning militias, centers on the trade-offs between quality and 
cost. This needs to be explored more fully in the modern context, given the remarkable 
outcomes of several conflicts where militia units have prevailed over standing militaries. 
One cannot assume anymore that a professional army should be preferred over a militia 
system, since the militia-like Israel Defense Forces defeated all the standing militaries 
invading their country in their early wars, but failed when confronted with irregulars like 
Fatah and Hezbollah. Moreover, both Soviet and NATO standing armies found 
themselves stuck while opposing “ragtag” irregulars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hence, 
sheer mass to the detriment of quality cannot be considered anymore as one of the main 
characteristics of the militia. Mass may still be a relevant characteristic; but researchers 
that put efforts into quantifying the outcomes of a militia-based system versus a standing-
army system (presenting militia units as ten times cheaper than the standing units, in the 
case of ready reserve, and only three times cheaper in the case of National Guard units) 
may be overstating its impact..11 This might be true for some militia units, where the cost 
of equipment is low when compared to the human resources’ cost. The military spending 
9 Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2006), 10. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Irvin Brighton Holley, Jr., General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 156. See also Paul K. Davis, “Planning Under Uncertainty Then 
and Now,” in New Challenges for Defense Planning, ed. Paul K. Davis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 
22. 
 8 
                                                 
per unit increases directly proportional with the readiness status of that unit, and is 
directly tied to the level of technology invested. For example, according to Holley12 units 
being taken into account are pure infantry units, equipped at First World War standards, 
therefore they imply low costs related to the equipment, as well as to the training required 
for using it. As modernity comes into play, one can expect the cost associated with 
equipment and the required training to grow exponentially, and to reduce the regular-
versus-militia cost ratio. As noted by the same author, using militia as fill-ins or cannon 
fodder is not the best mode of employment; taking into consideration the increasing costs 
necessary for a modern unit, militia is not cheap anymore either. 
As identified by Hodgson and Thomas,13 the term militia often has a negative 
connotation, and is often confused with other armed irregular groups, especially in 
situations in which they are challenging the authority of a state. This prejudice, however, 
does not capture the essential nature of militia groups. Militias may indeed not be 
professional soldiers, but this does not disqualify them from fighting alongside the 
governmental forces for the national defense. For the purpose of this study, militias will 
be defined as citizen soldiers enrolled in defense-related activities at the national level. 
Such examples can be found throughout history and across the spectrum of conflict; we 
will consider only the time period starting with the American Revolutionary War (late 
eighteenth century), since that era was marked by the appearance of modern armies and 
nation-states14 as we know them today. Militias played an important role in major 
conflicts and smaller interventions; ranging from the American militiamen who 
supplemented the Continental Army to defeat the British troops and their loyalists, to the 
German militia tradition, ranging from the Landsturm of Clausewitz’s time, to the 
Volkssturm of Nazi Germany. The Swiss military can serve as a standard example of a 
12 Holley, General Palmer, 498. 
13 Terry L. Hodgson and G. R. Thomas, Rethinking Militias: Recognizing the Potential Role of Militia 
Groups in Nation Building (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 5–17. See also Mohammed 
Osman Tariq, “Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in South East Afghanistan,” in Occasional Papers no. 7 
(London, GB: Crisis State’s Research Centre, 2008), 3. 
14 Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary, accessed March 24, 2013, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/nation-state. A nation-state is “a form of political organization in which a group of 
people who share the same history, traditions, or language live in a particular area under one government.” 
See also Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 121–125. 
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militia serving as the base of the conventional national defense (mirrored by the Israeli 
Defense Forces), while the National Federation of Peasants Rondas15 in Peru stands as an 
auxiliary defense system, keeping remote agricultural communities from succumbing to 
Marxist insurgent organizations. Hence, the first characteristic we will look for in a 
militia organization is the national sphere of influence. 
The next relevant attribute of militias is their relationship to the national 
leadership. Following the U.S. example that ended up putting the National Guard under 
dual command in order to include the federal government in the chain of command, this 
research will look for the nature of subordination to the centralized government authority. 
This is why, for instance, the Afghan Arbakai system will not be considered in this study, 
since they traditionally reject Kabul’s authority over their actions, and their activities do 
not usually extend to the national level. Arbakai may, in a general sense be militia, but 
here we are concerned with those organizations formed and controlled by the national 
government, regardless of the legitimacy of the latter.16 Hence, a second characteristic 
assigned to the militias in the scope of this thesis is direct subordination to the national-
level authority; not necessarily under government control, militias should still be at least 
under national-level command. 
The third aspect concerning militia organizations studied is the national 
responsibility to train, equip, and maintain them. Although initially the militiamen were 
asked to provide their own weapons, later development in the art of warfare and 
15 Mario A. Fumerton, “Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian Civil War: Peasant Self-defense 
Organizations in Ayacucho,” in Session 182 DEM, Armed Actors: Security Forces, Militias, and Guerillas 
in Latin America During the 1990s, March 16–18, 2000, http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/lasa2000/ 
fumarton.pdf. 
16 Afghan Militia and the French Milice are two examples of security forces working for a 
collaborationist government, which were seen as corrupt by their co-nationals, and were fought against; in 
the first case the Kabul government, working in close cooperation with Soviet advisers stood up citizen 
soldiers under the Militia denomination (Olga Oliker, Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime 
the Soviet Experience, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011 ); thus, the Arbakais, which are a tribal security 
system, will claim they are not militia (Mohammed Tarik, Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in South East 
Afghanistan, London, GB: Crisis State Research Centre, Occasional Paper no. 7), in order to clarify their 
non-collaborationist feature, although they are indeed a militia-type organization; the same holds true for 
the French Militia (Milice) during the German occupation in WW II (Stephen Cullen, Legion of the 
Damned: Milice Francaise, 1943–1945, 2008), which was seen as an opponent by the French partisans. 
Hence, in order to set a distinction between the collaborators and themselves, the underground 
organizations are assigning a bad connotation to the name “militia,” although they are militia as well. 
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increasing demands from the state to employ the citizen soldiers in engagements not 
directly related with their community, led to the assumption of these responsibilities by 
the state/government. Hence, militia performance is based on the readiness and 
proficiency level attained through centrally planned training programs, or particular 
standard training requirements issued by the central authority. 
The last relevant attribute of the national-level militia organization is represented 
by the political dimension affecting their morale and will to fight. As stated by Carl 
Schmitt in his “Theory of the Partisan,” irregular forces need a political dimension to 
keep them in fight.17 This is not necessarily adding a specific political ideology driving 
the soldiers in a revolutionary war (as it is the case of Schmitt’s partisans or Mao’s 
revolutionaries). On the contrary, the political dimensions this paper seeks to quantify 
stand for the national representativeness of militia, as opposed to their being regional, 
tribal, or partisan organizations. In this respect, different values of the dependent 
variables are expected when different political dimensions are intervening in the 
organization’s body. 
In conclusion, the militia organizations studied in this thesis can be defined by the 
provisions of the U.S. Code (Title 10, Section 311, Paragraph (a)): “The militia […] 
consists of all able-bodied males at [certain age] who are, or who have made a declaration 
of intention to become, citizens […] and of female citizens of the [state] who are 
members of the [militia organization].” To this generic definition, one should add the 
characteristics presented previously (subordination of the organization to the national 
chain of command, the states’ competency in equipping, training, and maintaining the 
militia, and the political dimension legitimizing the militia actions) to generate an 
accurate description of the organizations studied this thesis. 
17 Carl Schmitt, The Theory of the Partisan: A Commentary/Remark on the Concept of the Political 
(Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 10. The political dimension of the militia is considered 
in different, but not opposing, ways by the two authors. First, Schmitt attaches a political dimension to the 
partisans, making this the particular distinction between them and other armed groups; extended to the 
national level, this holds true in identifying militia representing the national authority among other possible 
armed citizens. On the other hand, Holley (General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldier and the Army of a 
Democracy) and Davis (Rethinking How Much is Enough ) portray the militia-based defense system as the 
sine qua non condition for a democratic government to legitimately employ force as the will of the nation. 
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B. HOW TO EVALUATE THE WORTH OF MODERN MILITIAS 
The central argument of this project focuses on the degree to which militia 
organizations may be able to exploit pre-existing skills and attributes of civilian 
population through the mobilization of non-professional citizen-soldiers. This has 
occurred at some points in history,18 but may represent an underappreciated source of 
national security, given the changing missions of the post-Cold War world. In this 
respect, besides the Norwegian Rifle Club members that thwarted the German attempt to 
capture Norway’s leadership in World War II, there were other situations where pre-
existing non-military skills were successfully employed while opposing hostile elements 
threatening a community. From the most relevant cases, worth mentioning are the 
American patriot militia of the eighteenth century, initially defending their homes from 
Native American raiding parties, and culminating with instances as the King’s Mountain 
battle, which began to turn the tide in the favor of the revolutionaries in October 7, 
1780.19  
Surprisingly, another militia, engaged this time on the counter-insurgent side, had 
a similar tide-turning effect in the 2013 Syrian civil war. Syria’s Assad regime, in 
conjunction with the Hezbollah militia, rebalanced the outcomes of the civil war by 
winning control of Qusayr village, seen as a strategic point in the development of the 
18 In 1940, Nazi Germany invaded Norway, in order to secure access to the country’s natural 
resources and its geo-strategic position. In order to do it quickly, the Germans deployed light infantry units 
(Fallschirmjäger) with the task of capturing the Norwegian king and the government, along with the 
Norwegian treasury. Taken by surprise, the Norwegian Army did not have time to mount an effective 
defense of the capital, therefore resorted to a hasty blocking position in vicinity of Midtskogen. Formed 
from a fraction of a Norwegian reserve company and local Rifle Club members, the defending forces were 
able to stop and force the German raiding party to withdraw, and gave the Norwegian leadership the 
opportunity to leave the country and take refuge in exile. (Francois Kersaudy, Norway 1940, New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1991), 80; Det Frivillige Skyttervesen, http://www.dfs.no/en/, English version).  
19 On that date, overmountain men (American patriot militia) ambushed and destroyed the bulk of 
loyalist forces in North Carolina. As the Independence War moved south, British authorities had high hopes 
for being helped by the loyalist population in the area to fight against the revolutionaries. However, the 
overmountain men employed their shooting skills, mostly trained through hunting for food and fighting 
raiding Indian bands, and their tactics were witnessed to be effective while opposing British regular units, 
and prevailed over an organized, British-led loyalist (Tory) unit. (http://www.learnnc.org/lp/editions/nchist-
revolution/4272). 
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conflict.20 Only in this case, the pre-developed skills were not related to shooting, but to 
better understanding and adjusting to the battlefield. Militia did not serve simply as 
cannon fodder, although they were reserved for this role by the nineteenth-century 
American military leader Emory Upton and his enthusiasts; Hezbollah excelled when 
employing pre-developed skills, under their terms, and compensated for their lack of 
formal military training with multiple means, more or less conventional, aimed against a 
less flexible opponent.  
With the industrialization of the global economy, the battlefield was seized by 
standing armies for various reasons; one of them is the irrelevance of citizens’ ability to 
apply force against an organized military element, along with the development of military 
knowledge that allowed the conventional units to avoid being caught in unwinnable 
engagements. Accordingly, militia sought engagements that could compensate for their 
lack of combat capabilities, and resorted to waging the war in three distinct ways: 1) 
either attend the required training to make them effective, as is the case of the Swiss 
military or the active reserve of the U.S. Army, for instance; 2) take part in fighting as 
auxiliaries or combat service support, where they could best employ their skills without 
directly engaging the opponent; or 3) engage in conflict only when cover or concealment 
provides them a decisive advantage over the opponent. By the end of the twentieth 
century, there was a dramatic change in warfare statistics: asymmetric wars became the 
dominant form of engagement. 
As indicated by Octavian Manea in a discussion with Dr. David H. Ucko and Dr. 
Robert Egnell, about their book Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges 
of Modern Warfare, 
War is about politics, and politics is about people; it follows that war is 
intimately tied to the people over or among whom it is fought. This 
relationship is only reinforced by the global trend of urbanization, which 
suggests that most operations will be conducted in built-up or at least 
20 Nicholas Blanford, “The Battle for Qusayr: How the Syrian Regime and Hizb Allah Tipped the 
Balance,” CTC Sentinel, no.8, August 2013, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/CTCSentinel- Vol6Iss8.pdf, 18–23. 
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inhabited environments, where the local population cannot be ignored, but 
more often must be co-opted or even protected against attack.21 
To be successful in battle today, one should develop completely different 
capabilities from those required until the end of the Cold War, in addition to the existing 
ones.22 
As defined in the U.S. Joint Publication 3.0, chapter I, para. (3), military 
operations are grouped in three major areas across the spectrum of military operations as 
follows: military engagements, security cooperation, and deterrence; crisis response and 
limited contingency operations; and major operations and campaigns. The probability of 
combat engagements grows gradually, from low probability to certainty across this 
spectrum. Table 1 is an attempt to use deductive logic for assessing the utility of 
individual or organizational civilian skills, across the range of modern military missions. 
Note that the applicability qualifier (none, low, medium, or high) given in the second 
column, refers to the degree to which pre-existing civilian skills can apply to the mission 
with respect to the additional basic training required; therefore, “high” means “no 
training,” and “none” equals full basic training is required for a civilian to be part of the 
operation. The third column refers to the applicability of militia/citizen-soldier units as a 
whole on the battlefield, not as fill-ins. The “goodness” rubrics provide a tentative 
assessment for the outcomes of involving militia units into operations, without taking in 
consideration the availability of standing units for support. This last rubric is split into 
two, one for each of the two core capabilities generally assigned for a military: homeland 
defense and power projection. 
21 Octavian Manea, “Learning from Today’s Crisis of Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal, 
October 8, 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/learning-from-today%E2%80%99s-crisis-of-
counterinsurgency.  
22 This thesis was also advanced in 2001 by Ivan Arrequin-Toft, “How Weak Win Wars- A Theory of 
Asymetric Conflict,” International Security 26:1, 122. 
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Table 1.    Potential use of pre-existing civilian skills across the 
spectrum of military operations 
Nature of mission 
Degree of which 
pre-existing 
civilian skills can 
apply to mission 
Investment of 








Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence 
Arms control and 
disarmament high medium high medium 
Nation assistance medium low‒high none medium 
Civil support high low‒high high high 
Enforcement of 
sanctions medium none‒medium none medium 
Protection of shipping low none‒low high none 
Freedom of navigation none none high none 
Crisis response and limited contingency operations 
Noncombatant 
evacuation operations high high N/A high 
Consequence 
management high high high high  
Foreign humanitarian 
assistance high high N/A high 
Peace operations medium low‒high high low 
Support to insurgency low low N/A low 
COIN medium medium medium medium 
Combating terrorism none none high none 
Recovery operations medium low medium none 
Major operations and campaigns 
Routine, recurring 
military activities none medium none none 
Strikes none none none none 
Raids none none low low 
Show of force low low none none 
Major operations low medium low low 
 
As can be observed, except for major operations and campaigns, pre-existing 
civilian skills can play a beneficial role during most military engagements. Current 
doctrine is trying to prepare the standing military units to better fit the tasks more often 
requested of the military to fulfill. This comes with a cost, though; professional soldiers 
have to assign training time for the new missions to the detriment of their initial training. 
If this is the case, one may wonder why the pre-existing resources are not efficiently 
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employed to the detriment of the ones becoming irrelevant. Steps were already taken at 
the organizational level, with the establishment of the Africa Combatant Command in 
2007 at the Department of Defense level, by assigning increasing roles to civilians in the 
leadership structure as an answer to the different nature of the newly identified theater of 
operations; however, the force-generating organizations still maintain their Cold-War-
style structure, and therefore, redundancy between the military and the civil sector still 
exists. If Arreguín-Toft’s identified need for more capability-oriented structures holds 
true, and the civil sector possesses the required resources to fill in those newly identified 
force requirements, then a larger, militia-based defense structure could provide an answer 
to the security needs of the twenty-first century. 
C. THE UTILITY OF MILITIA FORCES 
One of the basic needs of the society is safety. For ages, this was assured by 
employing the able bodied of its members in violent confrontations. Outcomes varying 
over time and the management of violence were assigned to a specific part of the society, 
which evolved from a warrior caste to modern standing armies. Instability and the 
dynamic evolution of the security environment have cast doubt on the notion of peace 
and war; thus, modern nation-states opted for sustaining a standing military to answer 
their security needs. However, the gap in the relationship between the military sector and 
the population at large allowed for situations where armed forces were not addressing the 
reason for their existence. This happened by being employed domestically or abroad, 
without this action matching the popular will;23 or by failing to address security needs the 
population demanded.24 This thesis states that militia-based defense systems better 
answer the security needs of the population, and maintain a close relationship with civil 
society; provide a hands-on control of the population to the defense elements; and 
23 The former Eastern Bloc countries excelled in employing their militaries against populations trying 
to challenge the communist regimes in their countries, as was the case in Hungary in 1956 or China in 
1989; the Israeli war in Lebanon in 1982 is just one example of a government using force abroad, without 
necessarily responding to a popular demand. 
24 The best example here can be considered the lack of actions by the British forces deployed in the 
area to prevent American Indians’ raids against the English colonists in North America. 
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enforce a reliable feedback mechanism that allows for better domestic and international 
situational awareness. 
D. CASE SELECTION AND RELEVANCE 
In order to identify the relationship between the militia-based security systems, 
the outcome of developing such a system for the states holding it, and the potential 
intervening variables and antecedent conditions that could influence these outcomes, a 
number of case studies will be presented.  
First, the battle of King’s Mountain will be addressed, from the mirroring 
perspectives of the Patriots, which were a pure insurgency-oriented militia, and the 
Tories, employed as conventionally-oriented fighters. Next, an analysis of the Israeli 
Defense Force’s (IDF) experience from their Independence War up to the Yom Kippur 
war of 1973 will follow. The IDF is a blend of conventional-and irregular-warfare-
dedicated organization, which consists of a regular army largely supplemented with 
militia type reserves. Its effectiveness has ranged from outstanding victories to 
lamentable defeats, and for the purpose of employing the controlled comparison method 
of difference, the two cases mentioned earlier will be analyzed. The last case studied will 
be the Swiss Military as a whole. Switzerland bases its defense on a national-level militia 
that is designed to deter any potential external military aggression.  
It is important to establish a research model to help identify the required features 
for a militia-based defense system to work. This thesis seeks to identify the potential of 
militias as valuable resources that present ready-made capabilities without decreasing the 
resoluteness of the assigned mission. The model assumes that militias require just enough 
training to fit in the defense environment, in addition to the particular skills that they 
might already have, and the potential terrain features that might play to their advantage. 
In their quest to establish a militia-based system in the U.S., Pentagon planners during the 
post-World War II era were acknowledging the difference in combat capabilities that 
would feature the American traditional fighting virtues, augmenting them with 
compulsory military training. In order to enhance the relevance of the study to the current 
conflict environment, close attention will be paid to the niche capabilities that militias 
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would address, as opposed to mirroring standard conventional professional militaries, but 
at a lower cost or on a larger scale. Finally, the model would imply that the lowest 
echelons of fighting will better accomplish their tasks if these are few and stable; 
therefore, one militia unit would act nimbly while employed steadily, rather than being 
constantly re-tasked and retrained.  
In conclusion, each situation will be presented through a brief description of the 
case, followed by an evaluation of the components discussed in the hub-and-spoke 
concept: the national character; the relationship with the national leadership structures; 
the national responsibilities in managing, training, equipping, and maintaining the units; 
and the intrinsic or extrinsic motivations backing the combat effectiveness of the soldiers. 
Next, the existence and the level of development of a militia’s particular skills, or the 
need for those skills to be further developed, will be sought. Finally, additional conditions 
that could influence the outcomes of military engagements presented will be considered.  
Following this research model, the case studies will be analyzed using a 
controlled comparison method, seeking to identify the degree to which a militia-based 
defense system may be a viable and attractive option, and tentatively identify the 
conditions under which this may be the case. 
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III. HUNTING THE BRITISH ARMY: THE OVERMOUNTAIN 
MEN AND THE KING’S MOUNTAIN BATTLE 
The Battle of King’s Mountain presents a case where politically motivated 
colonists of North America employed their shooting skills and defeated a well-trained 
formation of the British Army. Based on the military knowledge of the era, the odds 
favored the defending forces; but in this particular case, a series of other factors 
decisively influenced the outcomes of the encounter, providing the rebel militiamen the 
necessary advantage for winning. 
Following a brief presentation of the historical context, this chapter will dissect 
the two opposing forces, trying to establish whether the necessary characteristics of a 
militia-based defense system were in place, and what was their relevance in that 
particular military engagement. Next, it will focus on the importance of using hunting 
means and skills by the rebels, as opposed to the standard military skills employed by the 
Tory militia. Finally, the chapter will provide the conclusions that emerge from this tide-
turning event of the American Revolution. 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
After the hard fighting of the early years of the American Revolution, a stalemate 
ensued, with neither Rebel nor British forces able to achieve decisive victories against 
their foes. The general situation was rather unclear for the revolutionaries, or Rebels, as 
they were considered by the British government; the British troops retreated from most of 
the colonies, and the American National Congress replaced their royal governments, but 
they were vulnerable to retaliation by the British armies. With the French joining the war 
in 1778, the odds were somewhat leveled. Although the Rebels controlled many of the 
American colonies, the de facto situation resembled actually a widely dispersed civil war 
between the Rebels and Tories.25 Especially in the South, the Tory loyalist influence was 
significant and the Revolutionaries were busy quelling pro-monarchy supporters, while in 
25 Thomas B. Allen, Tories: Fighting for the King in the America’s First Civil War (New York: 
Harper-Collins Publishers, 2010), xiv, 285. 
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the north the Continental army was in a very poor shape. One of General Washington’s 
letters describes the difficulty of the situation in January 1780 as follows: “Our army by 
the first of January [1780] diminished to little more than sufficient garrison for West 
[P]oint, the enemy [is] at full liberty to ravage the country wherever they please…. The 
army is…dwindling into nothing.”26 In 1780, British forces under the command of Lord 
Cornwallis landed in South Carolina and recaptured the town of Charleston.27 The 
Rebels’ morale dropped after this event,28 and due to the pro-British and anti-rebellion 
sentiments of the population,29 the British forces were able to repel the Rebel Continental 
Army under the command of General Gates, and to re-establish British rule in the 
South.30  
Lord Cornwallis’ intent was to stabilize the South, then begin a drive to the 
Northern colonies, which were considered Rebel strongholds. With this in mind, he 
augmented his infantry and dragoons with loyalist provincial regiments,31 and started his 
drive north, and reached Charlotte. Under the command of the General Inspector for the 
Militia, Major Patrick Ferguson—perhaps the British officer with the greatest aptitude for 
warfare in the wilderness—Cornwallis’ left wing, comprised entirely of loyalist militia 
units,32 invaded North Carolina and expelled the Rebel militia from the region.33 
Moreover, he issued an ultimatum to the rebel forces west of the Appalachians to 
surrender to the King’s rule, or be pursued and destroyed.34 Perceiving the British Left 
Wing in their proximity as a threat to their existence, remnants of militiamen from the 
26 Allen, Tories, 284. 
27 Hank Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge “Mountain Men” in The American 
Revolution (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1976), xx. 
28 Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge, 41. 
29 Allen, Tories, 250. 
30 David J. Dameron, King’s Mountain: The Defeat of the Loyalists, October 7, 1780 (Cambridge, 
MA: Da Capo Press, 2003), 20. See also Messick, King’s Mountain, 44. 
31 According to Allen (Tories, xiv), throughout the war provincial regulars and loyalist militia fought 
in 576 of the 772 battles and skirmishes, and formed 29 loyalist military units , mostly of regimental size. 
32 Dameron, King’s Mountain, 11, 22. 
33 Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge, 63. 
34 Ibid., 80. 
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Rebel army requested the “overmountain men” help remove Patrick Ferguson’s force 
from the scene. The backwater or backwoods men, as they were called by their “more 
civilized” opponents, answered the call and mounted a raid aiming at the total 
annihilation of the loyalist threat. Combined with other militia elements from North 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia,35 the rebel force totaling around 1,000 mounted 
fighters moved into loyalist territory, gathered intelligence about their adversary, and as 
soon as they found it, planned an attack.36 Realizing the danger in which they found 
themselves, the loyalist echelon prepared a defensive stand at King’s Mountain and 
requested assistance from the main British force, stationed a few miles away in Charlotte. 
Ferguson reasoned that the terrain, the size of his forces, and the traditional fighting skills 
of his Tory militia would give him an edge over the bandits in pursuit.37 He and his 
troops were confident that the outcome of a potential combat engagement would 
favorable to them; however, the reality proved different. 
The rebels they were about to encounter were led by veterans of the French and 
Indian war of 1756‒1763,38 and the frontier war against the Native Americans in 1774.39 
As Messick puts it,40 the militia learned the utility of Indian-style fighting against British 
regulars, as opposed to the traditional military thinkers—who included George 
Washington. Thus, they employed tactics meant to benefit from the cover of the woods 
and their weapons’ superior accuracy, and to avoid direct confrontation with the enemy 
bayonet charges. After an encounter that lasted little more than one hour, the entire 
loyalist force was killed or captured on King’s Mountain,41 with the Rebels suffering just 
one-fourth the losses of the Tories.42 
35 Dameron, King’s Mountain, 35‒36. Messick, King’s Mountain, 63. 
36 Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge, 90. 
37Ibid., 124. 
38 Dameron, King’s Mountain, 25. 
39 Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge, 13,14. 
40Ibid., xvii. 
41 Dameron, King’s Mountain, 75. 
42Ibid., 76. 
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The effects of this encounter were devastating for the British attempt to raise 
loyalist forces to aid them for the rest of the war,43 and gave the Revolutionary army 
enough time to reconsolidate and regain the initiative that it kept.44 
B. THE “MILITIA” CHARACTER OF THE FORCES 
On the rebel side, the main actors were the ‘overmountain men,’ backwoods, or 
backwater men living west of the frontier designated by Royal proclamation in 1763.45 
These settlers chose to avoid British rule and live a better life outside the borders of the 
Empire. Due to the scarcity of education and governance in the area, they were regarded 
by other colonists as uncivilized, but they were determined to continue with their way of 
life and resist the British and Native American threat in the wilderness. As soon as the 
Revolutionary War broke out in 1776, they organized as a standing district and formally 
requested George Washington to consider them as a part of the Rebel side.46 Thus, they 
were full-time citizen farmers organized to defend their communities against external 
threats, who adopted the rebel side as a last resort, since the royal government outlawed 
their existence west of the Appalachians.47 Their subordination to the National Congress 
was effected through their leaders and fully accepted by the whole community. In respect 
to the other spokes of the militia concept, there were none. Mostly due to the remoteness 
of their location and the slow speed at which events occurred in the period, there were no 
formal contacts between the ‘overmountain men’ and the rest of the rebels. Although they 
were adept at fighting in the mountainous woodland, it was due to their need for survival 
there, and it happened without any involvement with the rebel defense system. They used 
in fighting the same weapons they used for hunting; their Deckard Long Rifles provided 
better accuracy and three times greater effective range than the standard muskets in use 
by the regular armies of the time.48 
43 Allen, Tories, 290. 
44 Dameron, King’s Mountain, 9. 
45 Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge, 7. Allen, Tories, 287. 
46 Ibid., 15. 
47 Ibid., 14. 
48 Dameron, King’s Mountain, 80. 
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They provided their own rifles, horses, powder, and food. The Continental Army 
barely had enough resources for its needs. Thus, it can be concluded that the 
‘overmountain men’ were trained, manned and equipped locally, and subordinated to the 
central authority through their freely elected militia leaders.49 
Opposed to this system, the loyalist militia raised under Major Ferguson was of a 
different sort. Part-time soldiers and full-time Tories, they were fully commanded and 
controlled by the British commander on the scene, and manned, trained, and equipped by 
central authorities.50 However, records attest that their equipment was incomplete, no 
uniforms were issued, and the militia had to improvise bayonets from butcher knives in 
order to meet the requirements of the traditional fighting standards.51 
C. THE USE OF PRE-EXISTING SKILLS 
It is obvious that the marksmanship skills of the frontier men were employed 
skillfully during the King’s Mountain battle. Using their own hunting rifles, the rebels did 
not need additional training for the fight. Having their leaders born and raised on the 
frontier,52 the ‘overmountain men’ had the opportunity to employ these hunting skills in 
a favorable manner, which ultimately enabled their victory. Messick53 even presents 
instances where the militia used the same tactics learnt in the war against the Shawnees, 
but this time against Tories, and won. It can be asserted that the ‘overmountain men’ 
militia tested their fighting style with great success. During the planning phase for the 
engagement on the King’s Mountain, the militia leaders held daily meetings and were 
closely concerned with the possible outcomes of the battle. Confident in their skills and 
fighting style, they undertook all the necessary actions to avoid traditional-thinking traps. 
For this, they removed the South Carolina militia commander (McDowell, who consented 
to this) from the chain of command, and passed it to Campbell, who was known to them 
from the wars on the frontier. These on-the-spot adjustments are unthinkable in a 
49 Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge, 40. 
50 Dameron, King’s Mountain, 53. 
51 Ibid., 24. Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge, 133. 
52 Dameron, King’s Mountain, 25. 
53 Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge, 74, 75. 
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conventional regular army, but the militia sometimes can afford the liberty of choosing 
the leadership they consider most appropriate.54 
This was not the case for the Tory militia. Under the command of Major 
Ferguson, the general inspector for the militia, the loyalists trained in massed volley-fire 
with the standard-issued “Brown Bess” musket, and in charging the enemy with 
bayonets.55 One could think that this was the only option for raising them to the status of 
a fighting force, but this would be an error. Both the militia men and their leader, Patrick 
Ferguson, were aware of the superiority of the rifle compared to the musket. On one 
hand, the loyalist militia and the rebel militia were, in fact, the same people, neighbors 
from the same communities or even members of the same families.56 Thus, to think that 
the loyalists were not able to fight in the same way their foes did would be against the 
historical evidence. As regarding Major Ferguson, he was ironically the inventor of a 
breech-loaded rifle that he proposed to be adopted by the whole British army.57 At the 
battle of Brandywine (1777), he commanded a rifle company that “performed 
brilliantly”58 while fighting non-traditionally, and Messick considers that it was the 
large-scale implications59 of adopting the new weapon and tactics that led to the 
dismissal of Ferguson’s revolutionary ideas. Thus, one explanation for so obviously 
denying the evidence could be the traditional way of thinking that the British officer and 
his loyalist followers could not abandon.  
54 Dameron, King’s Mountain, 26. 
55 Ibid., 19. 
56 Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge, 141–143. 
57 Dameron, King’s Mountain, 14–16. Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge, 133. 
58 Dameron, King’s Mountain, 16. 
59 Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge, 32–33. 
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D. OTHER INFLUENCING FACTORS 
Citing Nathanael Greene, Allen60 considers that the political conflict between the 
Rebels and Tories escalated into civil war during the American Revolution, and both 
sides fought each other with great savagery and relentless fury. When the British brought 
back the war into the southern colonies, Tories proved to be loyal to the British forces 
and supported the Redcoat army during the military engagements. However, they were 
less motivated than the Patriots, and this proves to be another contrast between the two 
opposing American factions. On the Rebel side, neutrality was not considered a crime; 
except for abuses against the most prominent Tories, the Patriots did not muster neutral 
parties under arms. On the contrary, the British did. Soon after the fall of Charleston, the 
British governor of South Carolina forced neutral people to take sides by ordering them 
to fight for the King.61 Thus, part of them sought refuge by joining rebel bands. 
Ferguson’s ultimatum, asking the ‘overmountain men’ to drop their cause and swear 
allegiance to the King, caused even an increased reaction among them, which eventually 
led to their raid to remove the loyalist regiment.62 The British and Ferguson’s militia did 
nothing wrong, in accordance with the traditional military thinking of the time. They 
were just out-thought by their opponents. Ferguson’s ideas were perhaps restrained by his 
aspirations as a career officer, while the Patriot militia commanders had no such concerns 
to hamper their judgment. As Holley63 notes in respect to the effectiveness of military 
officers, a reservist with broadly cultivated ideas may prove more effective when war 
comes than an officer with views confined by the traditional wisdom. Ferguson 
resembled the attributes of the latter. 
60 Allen, Tories, xiv, 285. 
61 Allen, Tories, 284. 
62 Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge, 90. 
63 Holley, General Parker, 333. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Surprisingly, the literature on the Rebel militia and the battle of King’s Mountain 
is sparse, despite their importance to the course of the Revolutionary War. The King’s 
Mountain battle caused the British forces to renounce their march from South Carolina to 
the north and prevented them from delivering a decisive blow to the weakened 
Continental Army. The aid provided by the unconventionally fighting rebel militia was 
not only decisive, but it was also free of charge. Following a couple of skirmishes that 
were no match for the loss of the entire Continental Army in the South, the rebel militia, 
lacking traditional training, equipment, and leadership, was able to destroy the Tory 
Loyalist movement in America and to deprive the menacing British forces of their 
American allies. 
In the Battle of King’s Mountain, opposing forces approximately equal in 
numbers clashed with an unexpected result. Approximately 900 Patriots completely 
defeated the left wing of Lord Cornwallis’ army, consisting of about 1,200 loyalist 
militia.64 The non-traditional force was able to outmatch its foe’s military skills with 
innovative employment on the battlefield of pre-existing hunting assets and skills tested 
in their previous wars with the Native Americans. 
The opposing forces were pure Americans, with the exception of the British 
commander. One might assert that the loyalists’ will to fight did not match the 
determination of the ‘overmountain men,’ who would have a more difficult time if they 
were to fight British regulars. This is denied by De Peyster’s report to his superior 
officer, Lord Cornwallis,65 as well as by the records of rebel militia fighting before66 and 
after King’s Mountain against regular troops.67 A revolution in military doctrine was 
64 Dameron, King’s Mountain, 53. Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge,120–124. 
65 Messick, King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge, 146. Cpt. De Peyster was Maj. Ferguson’s 
deputy in the loyalist regiment. 
66 Ibid., 74, 75. Overmountain men militia waged partisan warfare in South Carolina with great 
success at Fair Forest Creek and Musgrove Mill. 
67 Ibid., 181. The same tactics were employed in the dismissal of Banister Tarleton, Ferguson’s 
competitor for military career and glory. 
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emerging, and both militia commanders and professional soldiers acknowledged the 
superiority of the rifled weapon over the musket. However, the militia took advantage of 
it, not the professionals. 
The performance of the militia during the American Revolutionary War was 
brilliant. Started as self-defense body of citizens,68 Minutemen companies started the 
Independence War at Lexington and Concord69 and were the only option for both Patriots 
and British forces if they were to control the spread-out territory of the colonies.70 Less 
than fifty years later, the militia units, with their three months enlistment period, lost their 
reputation as reliable forces during the war with Mexico,71 although the battlefield 
performance was fully equal to the professional competence of the Regulars.72 
As of today, the United States military still features a large body of militia in their 
defense forces, known as the National Guard; however, they employ traditional fighting 
and mirror their active-duty counterparts. Subject to be deployed both in the proximity of 
their community or in remote areas, the National Guard is not reluctant to answer the 
requests of the political leadership, acting somehow in a Rebel, rather than a Tory 
manner. With the standardization of the battlefield, it seems that militia-style innovative 
thinking has its place in the new, joint operational areas. If one looks closely at the 
lessons learned during the Los Angeles riots of 1992,73 one will find more evidence 
supporting the better outcome reached using rather the National Guard militia than the 
standing army for quelling domestic unrest. 
68 Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History (New York: G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1956), 23. 
69 Ibid., 24. 
70 Millis, Arms and Men, 34. 
71 Ibid., 105. 
72 Jim Dan Hill, The Minutemen in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard (Harrisburg, PA: 
The Stackpole Co., 1964), 391. 
73 Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “Lessons Learned in Command and Control from the Los 
Angeles Riots,” Parameters, Summer 1997 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 
1997), http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/97summer/schnau.htm.  
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IV. ZAHAL—THE CITIZEN SOLDIERS’ ISRAELI DEFENSE 
FORCE 
No relevant study of militia-based defense systems should be conducted without 
closely surveying one of the most active military forces during the period following 
World War II: the militia-centered Israeli Defense Forces. Although the IDF has marked 
its existence with outstanding achievements, both doctrinal and operational, this chapter 
will address the 25-year period that covers from the Israeli independence war in 1948 to 
the Yom Kippur (or fourth Arab-Israeli) war in 1973, which is considered a “survival 
era” when Israel was a David opposing the Goliath of its larger and richer enemies. After 
1973, the Middle East “moved away from a total rejection of Israel,”74 and peace treaties 
were signed with Egypt and Jordan several years later. Evolving from a political situation 
where Israel could only fight for its survival, its policy encompassed plenty of 
interventions in the domestic politics of neighboring Lebanon, as well as suppression of 
insurgencies in the occupied territories after the Yom Kippur War; thus, this later period 
is less relevant for the purpose of this thesis: the study of militia models in more purely 
self-defensive roles.  
This chapter begins with a brief summary of the rise and development of the 
Israeli military (with an emphasis on the ground forces); the key points taken from The 
Six-Day War; and the IDF’s mixed performance during the Yom Kippur War. The 
following paragraphs will take a closer look at the organization of the military along the 
lines of the militia characteristics presented in Chapter II of the thesis, followed by an 
analysis of the use of pre-existing civilian skills in support of the defense establishment. 
Later sections will consist of other considerations relevant to the topic, and the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the Israeli military model.  
74 Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of 
Independence through Lebanon (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 379. 
 29 
                                                 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
In their book, The Israeli Army 1948–1973, Edward Luttwak and Daniel 
Horowitz defined Israel as a nation of soldiers, formed that way by geographical and 
political factors.75 The next paragraphs will briefly present the evolution of the Israeli 
military as it evolved from the underground organizations of the 1920s, to a national-
level defense structure; its military engagements with the standing militaries of the 
surrounding Arab countries in 1967, as the IDF became the most competent military 
organization in the region; and the controversial performance of this force in 1973, under 
auspices considered more favorable. 
1. From an Underground Movement to a Citizen Army 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the small Jewish population in 
Palestine had to face rising Arab militancy in the area.76 Jewish settlements survived the 
attacks of the larger Arab population and Bedouin raids by self-organizing in defense 
groups; the unification of these defense groups in 1937 produced a country-wide militia 
called Haganah.77 Although it tried to answer the security needs country-wide, Haganah 
was merely an underground organization, with its activities focused at a local level.78 It 
had a strictly defense-oriented policy, although some attacks were carried out against 
Arab bands as early as 1936.79 Following the First World War, the rule of Palestine 
switched from the hands of the Ottoman Empire to the British Empire under a “mandate,” 
and the latter recruited Jewish citizens to help them contain Arab unrest. The British-
supervised constabulary Palestinian Police, along with the newly formed Jewish 
Settlement Police and the civil guards (notrim) actually served as a cover for Haganah to 
continue performing their security duties, this time with the official support of an 
75 Edward N. Luttwak, and D. Horowitz. The Israeli Army 1948–1973 (Cambridge, MA: Abt Books, 
1983), viii. 
76 Luttwak, Israeli Army, 8. 
77 Ibid., 8, 11. 
78 Ibid., 11. 
79 Ibid., 12, 13. 
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unaware British consulate.80 The underground activities of Haganah expanded to include 
establishment of a central command over the Jewish security forces, some of them being 
already full-time police units officially under British control. It was during that time the 
future leaders of Israel exercised their command and control abilities in deploying the 
Fosh (field companies consisting of full time members of the Palestinian Police) country-
wide.81  
Further development of British policy in Palestine led to the employment of the 
Jewish police as Special Night Squads as counter-guerrilla forces, whose legacy will be 
found later on in the active defense policy based on night raids.82 Aside from the British 
official policy regarding immigration, the Jewish Haganah massively supported Jewish 
immigration to Palestine, and when opposed by the official rulers in the region, they 
turned against the latter.83 To resist both Arab aggression and British constraints, Jewish 
political leadership established an army-like defense structure under Haganah, consisting 
of maneuver elements (Hish, inspired by the effectiveness of Fosh and SNS) and static, 
village-level, self-sustainable defense forces (Him, consisting of old individuals, poorly 
armed).84 Following these so-called reforms, the Haganah had, by 1940, a central 
leadership paid by different political agencies85 and part-time field units (Hish and Him) 
able to answer the nation’s defense calls, but lacking adequate logistics and training.86 As 
the Second World War erupted, oppression of the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe sparked 
massive immigration to Palestine, and incentivized the Jewish population to volunteer to 
fight alongside Allied forces against Germany. Besides the “volunteers” conscripted by 
Haganah, a new mobile force was raised by the Jewish leadership in Palestine: the 
Palmach,87 designated to oppose Rommel’s armies that were advancing on Egypt. Later, 
80 Luttwak, Israeli Army, 13. 
81 Ibid., 14. 
82 Ibid., 15. 
83 Ibid., 16. 
84 Ibid., 17. 
85 Ibid., 9. 
86 Ibid., 17. 
87 Ibid., 17. 
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two extremist Jewish organizations joined forces with Haganah and Palmach: the 
dissident-inspired Irgun and Lehi.88 
When the United Nations voted the Palestine Partition Plan (November 29, 1947) 
and the British withdrew from the region, the Jewish nation was organized for fighting 
and defeated Arab opposition in the Palestinian area allotted to it by the UN. Under the 
unified command of Haganah, some 43,000 men and women were organized into part-
time Hish and full-time Palmach fighting units, ready to provide quick assistance to the 
whole able body of the villages’ population enrolled under Him;89 although they lacked 
weapons and ammunition, it is arguably the central command exercised by Haganah that 
allowed the Jewish victory over their Arab foes, since the latter were constantly provided 
fighting equipment by the neighboring countries, but lacked unified control.90 On May 
15, 1948, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF, also known as Zahal) was founded as the only 
legitimate military force of the newly emergent Jewish state.91 With 6,000 Palmach, 
18,000 Hish, an embryonic air force, and artillery, and with the leadership and combat 
capabilities developed in the fights waged during the previous 30 years, Israel began its 
independence war against the standing armies of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, 
which attacked the next day. Surprisingly, the IDF was able to coordinate its efforts and 
successfully defended its territorial integrity, adjusted its command and control structure 
by establishing a General Headquarters and four regional commands, increased its 
manpower to 12 brigades, and transformed Him into garrison brigades responsible for 
static defense duties of their hometowns.92 By October 1948, IDF was not only 
successful in withstanding Arab aggression, but its command and control structure, along 
with proper manning and training sections were functioning at high levels.93 The last of a 
88 Luttwak, Israeli Army, 22. 
89 Ibid., 23–25. 
90 Ibid., 32. 
91 Ibid., 37. 
92 Ibid., 43. 
93 Ibid., 45. 
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series of armistices and truces marked, in July 1949, the end of the first Arab-Israeli war, 
and witnessed a clear victory of the newly-born state and its army against its enemies.94 
The Army that assured Israel’s independence disintegrated after 1949,95 and a 
new structure was set in order to provide the required defense capability to the state. Due 
to the small size of the country, its inability to sustain an adequate-size standing army, 
and the lack of natural defenses,96 the IDF combined elements from the previous 
Haganah’s Hish and the Swiss dual system of home-guards and reservists into a militia-
type army able to act on short notice, with great emphasis on the reserve component.97 
Thus, IDF became a military structure consisting of all able-bodied in its society (except 
the Muslim-Arab minority) on 11 months’ leave,98 subordinated only to the Chief of 
Staff, which is in turn directed by the government.99 Its static forces resemble the 
Haganah’s Him taken over almost unchanged, with women and old men organized as 
local defense groups, under their own leaders, training plans, and able to cooperate with 
the Army’s maneuver units operating in the area.100 The main component of the IDF is 
the reserve element.101 It consists of established independent brigades manned by 
reservists102 that acquired the necessary training through a previous period of long 
conscription and maintained their skills by attending frequent refresher training. The third 
component of the army is the “standing,” or regular one. It is composed of the permanent 
cadre of career officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and specialists whose skills 
cannot be preserved through refresher training, and the annual conscript contingent, 
which follows the mandatory military service over a period of two to three years or 
94 Luttwak, Israeli Army, 52. 
95 Ibid., 71. 
96 Ibid., 76. 
97 Ibid., 77. 
98 Ibid., 79. 
99 Ibid., 98. 
100 Ibid., 77. 
101 Ibid., 79. 
102 Gunther Erich Rothenberg, The Anatomy of the Israeli Army: The Israel Defense Force, 1948–
1978 (New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1979), 72. 
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longer, according to the country’s security needs.103 According to Rothenberg, a high 
reliance is placed on civilian facilities and equipment, providing support during 
peacetime or requisitioned for war, which allows the IDF to deploy forward 50 percent of 
its force, as opposed to the one-to-four, teeth-to-tail ratio common in many other modern 
military organizations.104 The new army developed also its own doctrine and tactics, 
based mostly on the lessons learned during its 1948–1949 war. Decentralization of 
command, the role of the independent brigade in battle, the right combination of fire and 
movement/assault, the concept of active mobile defense, the role of the tank versus 
infantry, along with a preference for indirect approaches and night raids, were all 
developed and rehearsed during the years following the establishment of the new 
army.105 The next seven years were marked by anti-infiltration duties in conjunction with 
the home-guards along the borders106 and the establishment of the IDF’s elite units.107 
Thus, until the Sinai Campaign of 1956, the IDF’s reserve system was not tested in 
battle.108 During this campaign, the uneven performance of the reserve brigades alarmed 
military decision makers. They assessed the leadership of these units as irresolute, and 
reconsidered future officers’ training.109 Conscription and refresher training duration also 
increased to raise the combat effectiveness of the reserves to the required level.110 
Finally, the role of the tank and the composition of armored and mechanized brigades 
were reconsidered, with a greater emphasis on the tank formations, which required that a 
large portion of resources be directed to their necessary professional training and 
maintenance.111 Only the “positive indiscipline,” which was considered a consequence of 
103 Rothenberg, The Anatomy of the Israeli Army, 72. 
104 Ibid., 126. 
105 Luttwak, Israeli Army, 89‒93. 
106 Ibid., 105–106. 
107 Ibid., 110–113. 
108 Ibid., 155. 
109 Ibid., 157. 
110 Ibid., 181. 
111 Ibid., 189–192. 
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high morale and fighting spirit, remained evenly accepted in the IDF after the Sinai 
Campaign.112  
2. The Six-Day War 
The shortcomings of the IDF, as identified during the Sinai Campaign, were 
corrected by adjusting the officers and the reserve training during the next decade. More 
importantly, the armored corps, the air force, and the airborne units increased in size and 
developed their own doctrine,113 trying to meet a new standard and war-waging criterion: 
the fighting should be focused on achieving as much, in the shortest time possible, in 
order to secure the best outcomes until an externally imposed ceasefire will come into 
effect.114 Artillery and intelligence were given great importance, after they proved 
extremely useful during the previous war.115 In the face of Arab hostility, which had a 
galvanizing effect on Israeli society, the compulsory service for men was extended; this, 
in turn, corroded the public morale.116 
On the other side of the front, Egypt and Syria were openly manifesting their 
intent to destroy Israel in a war of annihilation, and in mid-May 1967, Egyptian forces 
began crossing the Suez Canal.117 Furthermore, the Syrian military appeared to be 
readying for war and threatening the northern part of Israel (the Galilee), and the 
continuous build-up of Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula posed a threat to which 
Israel could not symmetrically answer, due to the militia nature of its military.118  
Following Egypt’s removal of UN troops from the border area, Israel started to 
feel threatened and to see its deterrent capability at stake if it remained inactive. Although 
Israeli intelligence recommended the activation of the whole IDF (140,000 strength by 
1967), only half of it would be mobilized by the end of the month. In addition, active 
112 Luttwak, Israeli Army, 160. 
113 Ibid., 202. 
114 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 153. 
115 Luttwak, Israeli Army, 220. 
116 Oren, Six Days of War, 18, 30. 
117 Ibid., 75. 
118 Luttwak, Israeli Army, 222–223; Oren, Six Days of War, 76. 
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armored units were redeployed to the south, where the Egyptian threat was seen as 
increasing.119 In order to avoid a likely inevitable defeat, on June 5, Israel preemptively 
attacked its neighbors in order to “liberate [… itself] from encirclement.”120 In the first 
hours of battle, Israel destroyed much of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian air forces, 
relieving IDF ground forces of the need for air cover.121 The Israeli Air Force served as 
airborne artillery in support of the ground forces for the remainder of the war. This 
provided an enhanced freedom of movement for the ground forces, enabling the high 
mobility required for employing the indirect approach to battle preferred by IDF. 
During the first day of battle, Israeli ground forces used innovative combinations 
of armored units, paratroops, and artillery maneuvers, and encircled almost completely 
the Egyptian forces stationed in Sinai.122 During the next 24 hours, the Egyptian threat 
was neutralized, and after the fourth day, it was completely removed.123 Only political 
considerations stopped the Israeli brigades from crossing the Suez Canal and advancing 
to Cairo.124 Although the control of the Gaza strip took an extended period of time to 
complete, it should not diminish the overall success of the anti-Egyptian operation, from 
the Israeli perspective .125 Their strategic objective was to seize an easily defendable line 
in the proximity of Suez Canal, and the militia army performed extremely well against 
the Egyptian conventional foe. The extended struggle with the Palestinian irregulars in 
Gaza was considered a police action rather than a military operation. 
The other two opponents of the IDF were Syria and Jordan, who counterattacked 
following the Israeli air strikes. Postponing the requests for assistance of the northern 
settlements under the artillery fire of the Syrian military, the IDF’s leadership shifted the 
war effort against the Jordanian military in the east which, supported by the Arab 
119 Oren, Six Days of War, 76‒79. 
120 Ibid., 158. 
121 Luttwak, Israeli Army, 225–231. 
122 Ibid., 249. 
123 Ibid., 250, 259. 
124 Oren, Six Days of War, 240. Schiff Ze’ev, A History of the Israeli Army (New York: MacMillan 
Publishing Company, 1985), 131. 
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population in Eastern Jerusalem, threatened the Israeli side of that city. Despite the 
competent opposition of the Jordanian Army, the Israeli Air force, with the night fighting 
in which the Israelis surpassed their opponents and the employment of surprise, provided 
the IDF the opportunity to extend its control over the whole territory west of the Jordan 
River in only 48 hours, and by the end of the third day, to defeat the fierce Jordanian 
resistance in Jerusalem.126 The seizure of the sacred places in Jerusalem (especially the 
Temple Mount) by the IDF’s Central Command is presented by Oren as a catalyst for the 
Israeli Southern and Northern Commands to pursue similarly important achievements, 
and it led to disobeying the orders limiting their advance across the Suez Canal or beyond 
the Golan Heights.127 
During the engagements with Egypt and Jordan, the Syrian offensive consisted of 
a few timid actions that were easily repelled by the Israeli settlers and small detachments 
from the maneuver unit still present in the area.128 During the fifth and the sixth days of 
war, a reserve armored brigade in conjunction with the regular infantry brigade present in 
the area mounted a bold attack against the Syrian defense system on the Golan Heights 
and were able to seize yet another easily defendable alignment at the northern border. 
After vanquishing the Syrian troops defending on the Golan, the Israeli advance was 
stopped by the Soviet Union’s threatening posture.129 
The stunning victory of the IDF against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, did not go 
unnoticed. By the end of hostilities, Israel had expanded its territory by 300 percent, 
adding the whole West bank of the Jordan River, as well as the Sinai Peninsula; this 
determined a shift of international opinion against the country, especially with Arab 
propaganda introducing the idea of a Palestinian nation on the stage, and transforming 
Israel from a David fighting the Arab Goliath, into a Goliath oppressing the helpless 
Palestinian population.130 Indeed, if one takes into consideration the casualties at the end 
126 Oren, Six Days of War, 238, 240. 
127 Ibid., 259, 261. 
128 Luttwak, Israeli Army, 275. 
129 Oren, Six Days of War, 294. 
130 Ze’ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army, 175. 
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of the war, for each Israeli soldier dead, wounded, or missing, there were at least eight of 
his foes corresponding.131 
It also determined the IDF leadership to reconsider the role that the air force and 
armored corps should play in future battles, highly increasing their budget shares and 
adjusting tactics to emphasize the tank/plane combination, to the detriment of 
mechanized infantry which Israel so successfully used in previous wars.132 According to 
Luttwak, “[s]eldom has a victorious army undergone such a radical transformation so 
soon after its men and methods had proved so successful in battle.”133 In addition to the 
expanding role of the air force and armored units,134 Israel shifted its defense orientation 
to counter-terrorist operations against the rising Palestinian insurgency, positional 
warfare aimed at defending the new borders, increasing defense industry production 
capability, and a new foreign policy based on a single strategic ally—the United 
States.135 In order to achieve the combat capabilities imposed by the new doctrine, as 
well as to counter the growing Russo-Egyptian threat, Israel had to extend its 
conscription period for the active-duty component of the IDF to three years, the annual 
reserve duty to two months annually, and to allocate more than 25 percent of its annual 
gross domestic product (GDP) to the defense budget.136 
3. The Yom Kippur War 
Positional warfare was against the IDF’s traditional fighting style. Although the 
country’s borders were now suited to this type of defense, Israel preferred to maintain its 
reliance on mobility of the armored units137 and the versatility of the air force, which 
131 Oren, Six Days of War, 235, 306. 
132 Martin van Creveld, “Military Lessons from the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives,” The 
Washington Papers, no. 24 (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, CSIS, 1975), 1‒3. 
133 Luttwak, Israeli Army, 336. 
134 According to Rothenberg, the defense budged increased ten times, reaching $ 4 billion/year, of 
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achieved the status of an “all purpose” force able to attain any, if not all, goals possibly 
imagined on the battlefield.138 For example, the border with Egypt was guarded by the 
Bar-Lev line, an alignment of circular fortifications watching over the Suez Canal that 
served as an early warning system, and a mobile tank force kept deep in the defense zone, 
in order to protect it from the Egyptian artillery preparations of the offensive. Despite the 
reports of massive Egyptian build-ups west of the border, Israeli military intelligence 
considered that the active duty component of IDF, which by now was as large as 100,000, 
and its air force, were strong enough to contain an Egyptian invasion until the reserve 
troops would be mobilized.139 These intelligence estimates were not accepted by the 
commanding General of the Northern Command, who personally intervened at the 
defense minister level to augment the Golan garrison, in the face of an obvious Syrian 
concentration of forces,140 and obtained the redeployment of a whole brigade to the 
North. 
From a statistical perspective, Israel was at the peak of its military strength, and 
the force ratio between the IDF, fully mobilized, and its adversaries, was better than 
ever.141 However, when Egyptian forces attacked on October 6, 1973, they found an 
Israeli Army on leave, or observing the Day of Atonement, thus unable to properly 
defend against the full-scale, Soviet doctrine-like offensive that took place. With their 
tactics adjusted after the humiliating defeat in the Six-Day War, the Egyptian 2nd and 3rd 
Armies crossed the Suez Canal under an umbrella of anti-aircraft missile and gun 
batteries, encircled the Bar-Lev line fortifications, and established themselves in a 
defensive perimeter ten miles deep into Israeli territory, waiting for the expected 
counterattack. When this occurred, it was met with effective missile fire that forced the 
Israeli armored brigades and ground support planes to break off their attacks; the 
territorial commander’s decision to abandon the Bar-Lev line until reserve forces arrived 
was based on the inefficiency of the air force due to limited visibility, and the redirection 
138 Luttwak, Israeli Army, 298. 
139 Rothenberg, The Anatomy of the Israeli Army, 179. 
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of all available planes North, where they had to repel the Syrian offensive.142 Two days 
later, having another two armored divisions mobilized in Sinai, Israel launched a more 
powerful counter-attack, which achieved nothing but failure; its armored forces attacking 
Egyptian anti-tank zones suffered heavy losses, with one of the brigades being “almost 
totally wiped out.”143 This time, having lost about 400 of its tanks, the Southern 
command officers reconsidered the situation and decided to renounce the “infallible” 
direct armored attacks and re-employ surprise and the indirect tactics that proved so 
successful in earlier wars. 
This was the turning point of the anti-Egyptian campaign. The Egyptian Army, 
unable to think beyond the Soviet doctrine that allowed them to set foot east of the Israeli 
border, tried to advance further in order to relieve their Syrian allies fighting in the North 
from some of the pressure put by the Israeli Air Force, and the continuous flow of 
reserves driving to Galilee. Without their anti-aircraft umbrella, Egyptian armored units 
and mechanized infantry were routed, and by October 14, Israelis started to plan a new 
offensive operation.144 
Aware of their lack of effectiveness against prepared defenses, the Israelis 
breached the Canal defense line between the two Egyptian armies, crossed the Suez 
during the night of October 15 with elements from a paratroop brigade, and by 
improvised ferries managed to move a small number of tanks across the waterway. The 
ad-hoc constituted force, lately reinforced by another brigade, cut off the communications 
of an entire Egyptian army, which put Israel at an advantage when the UN Security 
Council ceasefire halted the operations about one week later.145 
On the Northern front, events occurred in a more rapid way, due to the different 
approaches used by both parties. On the attackers’ side, the Syrian offensive was based 
on a first echelon of three mechanized divisions, trying to create gaps in the Israeli 
defenses, through which two armored divisions were to penetrate into Galilee and 
142 Rothenberg, The Anatomy of the Israeli Army, 186. 
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beyond. Not much was accomplished during the first day of fighting, since the Israelis 
were expecting the Syrian attack, their defenses were reinforced by an extra armored 
brigade, and reserve elements started to arrive and reinforce the defense during the 
night.146 Moreover, the Israeli soldiers were alert, as opposed to the ones serving at the 
Egyptian border. Massively outnumbered, the two brigades guarding the Golan plateau 
resisted the Syrian attack, but suffered heavy losses; the Southern one ceased to exist as a 
unit by the morning of the next day, and only desperate air force runs prevented the 
Syrians from reaching the Jordan bridges in the South.147 The offensive stopped short of 
reaching its initial objectives, and by the next day, the attackers were forced to withdraw.  
On the other hand, the Israelis resumed a mobile defense and their higher gunnery 
skills and air support assured their success. With elements of two armored divisions 
mustered and incorporated into the fight early in the afternoon of October 7, and with a 
third one arriving during the night, the IDF Northern Command was ready to begin its 
counterattack.148 Contrary to the development of the war until now, the IDF managed to 
push the Syrians back to their initial positions by the end of the next day; next, the 
Israelis enveloped the Northern Syrian flank, threatening their capital,149 broke through 
Syrian overall defense line, and resisted the combined efforts of Jordanian and Iraqi 
units.150 Offensive operations stopped here, with Israel holding a serious edge over the 
combined Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian units, and from this point IDF focused on the 
development of the Southern front, in an effort to deprive as much as possible the 
Egyptians from their initial gains before an expected ceasefire came into effect. 
Thus, although controlling the battlefield when hostilities ceased, Israel did not 
accomplish much during this war. They lost the Sinai Peninsula at the post-conflict 
negotiation table, saw the tank/plane concept destroyed by the determined missile fires of 
146 Schiff Ze’ev, A History of the Israeli Army, 214. 
147 Rothenberg, The Anatomy of the Israeli Army, 188. 
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149 The Northern flank was enveloped and elements from an armored division set hold of the 
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their opponents, and had to admit that their leadership reflected an “ossified” military 
mind in some cases. They also had to admit that the unfriendly foreign attitude towards 
Israel’s policy prevented them from attacking first, fearing international intervention.151 
Although the intelligence failure determined a very late mobilization start, the causes for 
the initial poor performance of the IDF should be sought in the differences between the 
outcomes of the Southern and Northern command. In the North, where the commanders 
(mostly with paratroop background) and troops maintained a high readiness stance, the 
attack was repelled and initiative regained in less than two days. On the other hand, the 
Southern command persisted in the faulty doctrine until the losses became too high to go 
unnoticed. Although not specifically mentioned by the historians, the outcomes of the 
reserve units coming into battle were obvious. As soon as the reserves arrived on both 
fronts, the situation stabilized and the operational abilities of the central leadership 
decided the fate of the battles. 
The Yom Kippur War saw the first large-scale use of missiles on the battlefield, 
heralding the high attrition rate of modern mechanized warfare. Van Creveld points to the 
3,000 tanks lost by both sides in less than three weeks of fighting,152 while Rothenberg 
compares the flow of missile supplies with the distribution of shotgun cartridges.153 Yet, 
the only positive element for Israel in this war comes from the Golan campaign, and it is 
the confirmation of the high quality of its soldiers, being those reserves or active-duty.154 
151 Oren, Six Days of War, 315.  
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B. THE “NATIONAL MILITIA” CHARACTER OF THE IDF 
The Israeli Defense Forces present, from their inception until today, an example 
of how a small nation, surrounded by hostile neighbors, and deprived of the most 
elementary natural defenses, is able to survive by engaging the whole able body of its 
citizenry in the defense system. Luttwak,155 Rothenberg,156 and many others present 
accurately the way in which Israel keeps all able-bodied citizens enrolled in military 
reserve units, and maintains their combat capabilities through annual refresher courses.157 
The length of the refresher period ranges from one to two or three months, depending on 
the training objectives identified by the central command. Except for the refresher 
periods, Israeli reservists are civilians for 11 months, and are called to arms only for 
mobilization. What this reserve-based system successfully implements is the placement 
of the reservists on the top of the defense forces, therefore discouraging any sense of 
superiority of the active-duty component of the IDF.158 The small nucleus of the active 
military has a primary role to enable the mobilization flow, so that the reserve units will 
be operational in less than 24 hours. This way, the small nation of Israel can engage in a 
full-scale war on short notice;159 later development of the military doctrine after the Six-
Day War bolstered the active component’s role to that of containing an initial attack, but 
the character of the reserves, and thus of the part-time soldiers, as the consolidated body 
of the IDF remained.160 
Besides stressing the need for a large military, perhaps the next essential feature 
of the IDF, which granted it the capability to deal with multiple enemies simultaneously, 
is the centralized subordination of all forces to the national level. Tailored initially on the 
rudimentary command and control structure of the underground Haganah, the modern 
IDF has a general staff, which integrates all combat elements, and is commanded by the 
155 Luttwak, Israeli Army, 76. 
156 Rothenberg, The Anatomy of the Israeli Army, 68‒70. 
157 Ze’ev, A History of the Israeli Army, 122. 
158 Luttwak, Israeli Army, 77. 
159 Ze’ev, A History of the Israeli Army, 51. 
160 Ibid., 122. 
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chief of staff.161 Despite decentralizing decision making as much as possible, the 
national-level command may easily move the subordinated forces from one theatre to 
another, according to the battlefield needs. The small size of the country allows rapid 
redeployment of units, and the flexibility of their tactics and high frequency of training 
sessions fosters smooth cooperation between intermingled units. Although the ground 
forces are organized in three separate commands (North, designed to contain a Syrian and 
Lebanese aggression, Central, tailored to control unrest in West Bank and to respond to 
potential Jordanian threats, and Southern command, specifically designated to withstand 
aggression from South and South-West)162 the actual ground units can form different 
combinations, from armored-only to pure mechanized infantry or elite paratroopers units. 
Since the introduction in the Sinai Campaign of the ugda—literally a Hebrew term for the 
nowadays task-force163—the problem of cohesion, adaptability, and improvisation at 
division level and above was doctrinally established. 
The need for national-level responsibilities for manning, training, and equipping 
the reserves was identified as early as the underground activity of Haganah during the 
British rule in Palestine, and they were formally established as individual entities under 
the General Staff immediately after the independence was proclaimed.164 According to 
Schiff,165 the General Staff tries to issue the reserve units weapon-systems that are easier 
to use, store, and sustain, and this could sometimes affect their more precarious and less 
technology-oriented features.  
Together with the national-level command and control, the centralized training 
and equipping authority succeeds in embracing as much as possible from the national 
existing resources, and in generating enough fighting power to overcome the country’s 
scarcity of resources.166 Rothenberg167synthesizes the IDF as the means and ends 
161 Ze’ev, A History of the Israeli Army, 123. 
162 Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army, 50. 
163 Rothenberg, The Anatomy of the Israeli Army, 106–120; Luttwak, The Israeli Army, 176. 
164 Luttwak, The Israeli Army, 45. 
165 Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army, 122. 
166 Rothenberg, The Anatomy of the Israeli Army, 102, 126. 
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through which Israel educates its citizens,168 while engaging all state-supported 
activities—transportation, health preservation, communications, constructions—into a 
complex military-civilian oriented system. 
With respect to the third spoke of the national militia concept, the political 
dimension of the Israeli militia can be summarized in the speech that one officer 
delivered to his troops: “[I]f we lose, we will have nowhere to return.”169 Despite the 
political affiliations of the soldiers, the active solidarity between the troops gives IDF an 
advantage over the poorly linked soldiers from the opposing Arab militaries.170 
C. THE USE OF PRE-EXISTING SKILLS 
There is an obvious difference between the lack of traditional Jewish military 
organizations171 and the Israelis’ developed skills for handling weapons and tactics.172 
Notwithstanding the long conscription period and the refresher training, which do not 
have the same quality outputs for other militaries, the explanation can be found in the 
emphasis Israel puts on the pre-military training of its youth. In order to develop the 
physical and mental skills of the young, IDF general staff incorporates two separate 
commands dedicated exclusively to making full use of the resources of the next 
generation before reaching the military age. Gadna and Nahal are two separate 
commands holding the same hierarchical importance as the territorial commands, air 
force, navy, training, and resources inspectorates.173 From the two, Gadna trains and 
educates young Israelis, despite their sex, religion, or ethnicity, starting from the age of 
14 until they reach the last stage of high school; in the process, they become familiar with 
all military-related activities, except for shooting.174 Next, only the Jewish youth and 
some of the Druse community continue their paramilitary education, with an emphasis on 
168 Luttwak, The Israeli Army, 205. 
169 Oren, Six Days of War, 179. 
170 Luttwak, The Israeli Army, 284. 
171 Ibid., 54. 
172 Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army, 102. 
173 Luttwak, The Israeli Army, 100. 
174 Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army, 103. 
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training in arms.175 If needed, these under-aged citizens will perform military duties 
under the Nahal’s supervision. 
The other way Israel benefits in war from the pre-existing skills of its citizens is 
the high reliance that the army puts on the civilian infrastructure, as presented previously; 
this way, the General Staff is able swiftly to employ up to 50 percent of its forces to the 
front line.176  
D. OTHER INFLUENCING FACTORS 
There are a couple of other factors that influence the success of IDF. Some of 
them, such as the exemption of illiterate people from military duty, are the merit of Israeli 
maturity in shaping its defense policy. To the same category belongs the officer training 
and selection, namely the lack of a standing military academy, which means all officers 
are drawn from the rank and file.177 A great emphasis is put on the officers’ natural 
leadership skills,178 and leading by example is considered a matter of morality.179 There 
is also the participation of all soldiers in the officers’ selection process that assures the 
recognition of their leaders’ qualities.180 
The geographic disadvantages of Israel’s defenses are concerns, but in some cases 
can help. Negev Desert climatic conditions in the South, for instance, forced the 
encircled, leaderless Egyptians to give up fighting when out of water and food during the 
Six-Day War. Six years later, the encircled Third Egyptian Army ran out of water, and 
interventions from United States were necessary to force the Israelis to allow their foes to 
survive. It was the innovative Israeli leadership that put the Egyptians in these 
unexpected situations; thus, the merit should be given to the former. 
175 Ibid., 105. 
176 Rothenberg, The Anatomy of the Israeli Army, 126. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The Israeli Defense Force provides an outstanding example of how a small 
country, lacking essential resources, can withstand bigger and richer adversaries. Having 
the militia as the only practical defense option, Israel developed the concept of 
mechanized warfare for its citizen army. Starting with a complete part-time military 
during the British protectorate, Israel officially established its military right after 
proclaiming its independence and since then maintained a continuous state of war with 
most of its neighbors. Yet, despite the high degree of specialization required to operate 
modern fighting assets, Israel managed to maintain a ratio of one-to-four active/reserve 
components by 1983, which is subject to constant change depending on the length of the 
conscription period and the size of specialist components required to man advanced 
fighting assets.181 
After van Creveld noted in 1975 that modern warfare requires the war-making 
capability of a country to be linked to the other constituents of the society in order to 
determine the outcome of war,182 Schiff puts IDF in a central position in the Israeli 
society, without labeling the latter as a militarist one.183 Hence, there is a special bond 
between the Israeli military and the society from which it emerges that allows its 
ascendance over the other militaries in the region. 
181 Luttwak, The Israeli Army, 102. 
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V. A NATION IN ARMS—THE SWISS MILITARY 
Switzerland is considered one of the oldest democracies in the world, and the 
Swiss military is its guarantor. This chapter proposes a closer look at the defense system 
that allowed Switzerland to maintain its armed neutrality over the last seven centuries, 
and will try to identify the conditions that made it possible for this small country to 
remain at peace in the heart of Europe, while the whole continent was continually 
engulfed in the flames of war, including the two world conflagrations of the twentieth 
century. To the casual observer, the country could appear too insignificant to become the 
target of a military aggression, or one might assume that its policy makers possess some 
special diplomatic abilities that enabled its neutrality for such an extended period of time. 
In fact, nothing could me more erroneous; in the next section, a brief historical overview 
will present the evolution of Switzerland from the Confederation of Cantons to today’s 
Switzerland, backed by the armed character of its citizenry. 
Next, the characteristics of the militia army will be approached, based on the hub-
and-spoke concept, followed by the use of pre-existing civilian skills. Since this case 
presents a particular interest due to the particularities that make the country unique in its 
performance in keeping conflicts far from its territory, other factors potentially 
influencing its neutrality will be analyzed in order to single out those variables that could 
not be generally applied to other nations.  
The chapter will end with the conclusions underscoring the features that make 
Switzerland the most renowned country in the world for its neutrality, and the lessons 
that other nations can learn from the “Swiss model.” 
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A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A good sense of Switzerland today can be found in the special chapter dedicated 
to the Swiss soldiers by Sir Charles William Chadwick Oman in his book The Art of War 
in the Middle Ages‒A.D. 378–1515,184 as well as in other authors’ works.185 Under 
constant pressure from their eastern Austrian neighbor, at the end of the thirteenth 
century186 three Alpine communities established a trilateral agreement for assistance “in 
the interest of mutual security and peace.”187 Lacking large population and resources, this 
Confederation of free herdsmen from the Alps began their fight for freedom in 1315, 
destroying at Morgarten an Austrian army probably six times larger and better equipped 
for war than the 1,500 peasants they mustered;188 this militia army proved wise in 
choosing a battlefield where the terrain gave them protection against the traditional 
cavalry charges that the Austrian medieval knights were seeking to use, and also greatly 
restrained the maneuver of the infantry following from the rear. What resulted was almost 
a complete destruction of the cavalry operating in front of the army and their panicked 
retreat, which instilled fear in the ranks of the infantry which tried to leave the battlefield 
rather than fight, and the chaos that infected the Austrian army enabled a slaughter that 
the ruthless Confederates took advantage of immediately.189 Some 20 years later,190 the 
Confederation army defeated—this time on an open field—another superior Austrian 
army.191 Just as in the previous fight, the Austrians fought in the traditional manner they 
184 Charles William Chadwick Oman, Sir. The Art of War in the Middle Ages-A.D. 378–1515 (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1953). 
185 John McPhee. La Place de la Concorde Suisse (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1984); William 
E. Rappard, Collective Security in Swiss Experience,1291–1948 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
1948); Stephen P. Halbrook, Target Switzerland: Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II (New York: 
Sarpedon, 1998). These latter authors, while supporting Oman’s notes, focus on the later development of 
the country and its military; thus, the first reference pays much closer attention to the birth of what will 
became The Country of the Cantons in the nineteenth century.  
186 William E. Rappard, Collective Security in Swiss Experience, 1291–1948 (London: George Allen 
& Unwin Ltd. 1948), xi. The three communities were Uri, Schwytz, and Unterwalden. 
187 Rappard, Collective Security, xi. 
188 Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, 89. 
189 Ibid., 87–89. 
190 Laupen, 1339 AD. 
191 Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, 89. 
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were accustomed to, but for which the Confederation militiamen had developed a 
countermeasure: the pike. However, the Laupen defeat did not deter the ambitious 
Austrian prince from trying to bring the Swiss to his will, and mounted another 
expedition in the Alps and met the Confederation army at Sempach, 1386.192 Although 
this time the cavalry dismounted to deny the advantage of the pikes over the cavalry, the 
heavy weapons that the militiamen developed to overcome the mail armor of their 
adversaries193 drove the battle towards a complete carnage, similar to the one at 
Morgarten 70 years earlier.194  
The Swiss weapons and tactics (pikes and column) proved to be a redoubtable 
match for the feudal mailed knights that owned the battlefields of that era; fierceness, 
mercilessness, brutality, ferocity, and determination, and with an attitude of “no quarter 
given or expected” qualified the Swiss as the best fighting infantry of the period. To 
outline the Swiss boldness while encountering invaders is the example from 1444, in 
which a single column of about 1,000 Confederation infantry attacked an invading army 
15 times larger and fought to the last man, killing double their numbers; as a result, the 
commander of the invaders decided to retreat before facing the main Swiss force.195 
Such achievements, the difficult terrain, and the Confederation forces’ ability to 
quickly mobilize and to move rapidly to meet the enemy, undermined the morale of any 
invader of the Swiss nation to the point that made them expect defeat.196 The battles of 
Grandson, Morat, Nancy, Frastenz, and Dornach between 1476 and 1499 were the last 
battles on Swiss soil until the French Revolution at the end of eighteenth century.197 
However, the Confederation failed to see their enemies’ responses to their tactics, and 
192 Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, 93. 
193 Besides the halberd and the two-handed sword, the Swiss developed the Morgenstern and the 
Lucerne hammer, weapons particularly effective against armored opponents. McPhee, La Place de la 
Concorde Suisse. 
194 Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, 93. 
195 Ibid., 96. The same resolve was shown by the Swiss Guards during the sack of Rome in 1527, and 
Napoleon’s take-over of the Vatican; in Carol Glatz, Swiss Guard: Keeping the Peace and Protecting the 
Pope for 500 Years, in Vatican Letter, May 7, 2004, 
http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/swiss.htm. 
196 Ibid., 97. 
197 Ibid., 97–104. 
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their victories became costlier each battle, until they were finally defeated by the Spanish 
infantry and the German Landsknechte.198 Still the Confederation remained a major 
mercenary infantry provider for their wary neighbors; but after a costly defeat at 
Marignano in 1515, the Confederation renounced any conquest campaigns199 and 
focused on the country’s development and defense. 
The long period of peace over the Confederation of initially three, then 13, then 
19, and later 22200 Cantons, known as the Helvetic Body, ended in 1798 when the 
country fell under the French occupation of Napoleon’s armies. The cohesion of the 
nation was first weakened by French propaganda that disunited the Swiss; the French 
cantons based in the Jura Mountains abandoned the Swiss cause, and the Grande Armėe 
penetrated the Helvetic fortress. The remaining Swiss cantons mounted a resistance on 
the Alps Plateau, but they were defeated by the superior numbers, equipment, and 
fighting capabilities of Napoleon’s army,201 despite their heroic stand. 
However, the Swiss enjoyed a period of peace, order, and prosperity, while being 
administratively organized by Napoleon Bonaparte as a Federal Republic.202 Following 
the fall of Napoleon, the Helvetic Confederation decided to keep in their fundamental law 
the Napoleonic influence that proved beneficial to the country; the same era witnessed 
the solemn recognition from the Concert of Europe the neutrality of Switzerland as being 
in the “true interests of the policy in Europe as a whole,”203 and independence, as well as 
neutrality, remained stipulated in all constitutional revisions until today.204 
Being defeated by Napoleon forced the Swiss to reassess their defense 
capabilities, and the following 125 years205 were dedicated to the establishment of a 
198 Ibid., 107. 
199 Rappard, Collective Security, 16. 
200Ibid., xii. 
201 Stephen P. Halbrook, Target Switzerland-Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II (New York: 
Sarpedon, 1998), 14. 
202 Rappard, Collective Security, 27. 
203 Ibid. (1815). 
204 Ibid., 30. 
205 Halbrook, Target Switzerland, 15. 
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militia system able to anticipate new types of threats. They acknowledged their weakness, 
especially their lack of unity and “spiritual” national defense, and the need to resist 
modern armies and foreign propaganda.206 As a German observer would note in 1857, 
the new citizen army, by that time preparing to repel 150,000 Prussian soldiers, could 
count as “half a dozen standing armies.”207 In 1874 the militia forces from all cantons 
were subordinated to a federal command structure;208 besides these organizational 
improvements, they abandoned direct confrontation tactics, and resorted to rifle-centered 
doctrine. The Swiss began to produce their own rifles,209 coupled with nationwide 
shooting training. As George W. Wingate remarks,210 in the early twentieth century in 
Switzerland there were 3,656 rifle clubs, under which 218,815 members from a 
population of around 3 million people were shooting 21 million cartridges with the 
standard army rifle. In these conditions, during the First World War the country protected 
its neutrality resorting to an “occupation of the frontier” strategy211 that required the 
mobilization of 450,000 citizens,212 all good marksmen armed with a Swiss-made rifle 
designed in 1911.213 
Contemplating World War II, Switzerland readied its militia again; Nazi 
propaganda that tried to include the German-speaking Swiss population into the Third 
Reich214 signaled that the government’s integrity was threatened again. As early as 1933, 
$39 million was appropriated for new rifles, machine-guns, and artillery.215 Two years 
later, the basic military education period was extended to match the new battlefield 
206 Halbrook, Target Switzerland, 14. 
207 Ibid., 16. 
208 Ibid., 17. 
209 Ibid., 17. 
210 Ibid., 18. 
211 Ibid., 19.  
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development.216 New “K 31” rifles were designed to overcome the new Mauser 98 K 
issued to the German military.217 Swiss Parliament appointed a general as the 
commander in chief (this is the only general officer position in the Swiss military) in 
1939,218 and the General took decisive steps to strengthen the national resistance to fifth 
column strategies employed by the German propaganda against Switzerland.219  
Besides the “danger from the interior,” Switzerland was susceptible to having its 
territory used by either of the warring parties to outflank its opponent, a common threat 
that was also present in the Franco-Prussian war and World War I.220 Although initially 
focusing its defense against a potential German threat from the northern border, the fall 
of France to the Germans transformed Switzerland into an oasis of freedom surrounded 
by the Axis’ Forces. Although Finland’s initial success in defending against the superior 
forces of the Soviet aggression221 by using the terrain and the high-level marksmanship 
skills proved that Switzerland could be defended in a similar manner, the swift fall of 
Greece and Yugoslavia convinced the military leadership of the futility of any attempt to 
defend the whole frontier against the Blitzkrieg strategy.222 Therefore, concomitant with 
the increase of shooting training for the civilians, to include women,223 the Swiss Army 
focused its strategy on using the mountainous area as the defense hub,224 oriented the 
training to more efficiency in using the terrain,225 and decided that abandoning 
significant parts of the country’s population to a potential adversary in full offensive 
would be the only feasible defense option.226 This sound, although bold strategy, 
216 Ibid., 35. 
217 Ibid., 37. 
218 Halbrook, Target Switzerland, 76. 
219 Willi Gautschi, General Henri Guisan (New York: Front Street Press, 2003), 135,157, 548. 
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convinced the German military planners that any attempt to subdue Switzerland would 
lead to no strategic gains, since the territory would remain unusable for military 
purposes.227 It is considered that this Reduit Nationale strategy and General Guisan’s 
speech promoting a “no surrender” and “fight to the last bullet” direct orders228 
addressed to all military leaders in the Swiss Army soon after the fall of France had the 
necessary compelling weight that deterred a German aggression and raised the morale of 
the Swiss military and society,229 which had deteriorated after the partial demobilization 
decided by the political body soon after the German-French armistice.230 
Although Switzerland faced serious security, economic, and political problems 
during the Second World War, the country’s independence and territorial integrity 
remained intact.231 The military preparedness of the Swiss nation and General Guisan’s 
strategies oriented to strengthening the discipline and will of the troops, and to creating 
close ties between the people and the army worked.232 As Halbrook233 states, 
Switzerland escaped Nazi occupation due to two reasons: the doctrine of armed 
neutrality, defended by almost a million people under arms;234 and the decentralized 
character of the federal state, with no elite body having the authority to surrender.235 
After the war, Switzerland maintained its armed neutrality policy, and tried to 
watch closely the evolution of warfare, in order to keep its militia army ready to 
227 Ibid., 125. 
228 Gautschi, General Henri Guisan, 144, 238–239. 
229 Ibid., 238–239. 
230 Ibid., 165‒170. 
231 Ibid., 180.  
232 Ibid., vii, 692. 
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effectively repel a potential aggression.236 As it will be presented in the next section, the 
Swiss army is still one of the largest and best trained militaries in Europe.  
B. THE MODERN SWISS ARMY 
The record of not being involved in a war from 1515237 is not easy to match, and 
the Swiss nation and its military are dedicated to keep raising the bar. Through proper 
display of their timely preparations and the decisive will to defend, the deterrent effect is 
achieved.238 The current section tries to be a brief analysis of the Swiss Army, as it can 
be seen from outside. John McPhee’s book, La Place de la Concorde Suisse, is the main 
source for the following paragraphs, and it is corroborated with Halbrook’s notes from 
the last chapters of his Target Switzerland. 
What both authors point out upfront is the militia character of the military, its 
high level or readiness,239 and the impressive numbers that the Swiss defense 
establishment advertises. Numbering 650,000, according to McPhee, and targeting a 
downsizing to 400,000 in 2005, based on Halbrook’s evidence,240 the Swiss Army 
clearly seems to be a redoubtable force. All males are part of the military for 30 years,241 
the first 20 as members of “active” units, and then subject to being called until the age of 
50.242 On a voluntary basis, women can serve in the military for a period of 15 years243 
in the auxiliary or specialized units. The Swiss believe that if a country is defended by 
such an “impressive” army, a war will never start.244 These are indeed impressive 
numbers, totaling about 10 percent of the country’s population, with 99.5 percent armed 
236 Ibid., 240. 
237 This is a common theme found in both McPhee’s and Rappard’s books; however, as presented in 
the previous section, Napoleon Bonaparte succeeded in fighting and defeating the Swiss militia, with the 
cooperation of the population from the French-speaking cantons. 
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civilians, leaving the rest of 0.5 percent for professionals.245 Even in the General Staff, 
consisting roughly of 2,000 officers, only half of the personnel are professional 
soldiers.246  
This vast army has a mobilization time considerably shorter than 48 hours, 
according to McPhee.247 Such an astonishing system provides a time-frame that will be 
met under the most difficult conditions. The quickest Swiss reaction time is given by 
Halbrook, who states that the militia can mobilize in as little as four hours, and reach any 
part of the country in another two.248 The army-issued weapon is so usual in a Swiss 
house that it is considered part of the furnishing;249 additionally, the Swiss soldier keeps 
the ammunition at home that might be necessary before reaching the mustering point and 
his/her gas mask.250 Thus, almost half a million soldiers, owning at home a similar 
number of small arsenals, are trained to man state-of-the-art military equipment after 
reaching their units. Switzerland provides the best weapons for the military,251 some of 
which are Swiss-made.252 One of the requirements of any piece of equipment issued to 
the militia soldier is to be “user friendly” and easy to maintain operationally for the long 
period of service they intend to keep them in use. 
Usually, the total number of days spent during the periodical refresher courses 
and integrated training is around 365 in 30 years of service for a private. The amount of 
training increases with the rank, and the Swiss considered this as a “pay” for the rank. To 
the meticulously calculated 365 service-days of a private, the corporal will add another 
140, the lieutenant 236, the captain 165 or more, up to the level where a colonel will 
serve not less than 1,200 extra days. On top of this, the General Staff officers will add 
245Ibid., 12. 
242 McPhee, La Place de la Concorde, 62. 
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eight weeks of duty every year.253 For all these days spent in the service, the Swiss 
industry pays its armed workers as usual, and the people consider the events as part of 
their lives. There is a positive correlation between military training and efficiency at 
one’s workplace, thus military duties and responsibilities are part of every Swiss résumé. 
There are even some jobs inaccessible for people who are not part of the army;254 Swiss 
society and the military complete each other, since military training is considered useful 
for the civilian occupation, and conversely one’s civilian occupation is matched with 
leadership qualifications.255 The army takes advantage of any civilian experience and 
skills that the militia possesses and that results in appropriate assignments.256 
Nested within the society, the Swiss military relies on another determinant factor 
that bolsters its defense capability: the terrain. The mainly mountainous territory of the 
country is carefully prepared by the military for a “porcupine” style defense concept.257 
Around three permanently manned defense centers,258 each resembling a true fortress, a 
discrete military infrastructure is concealed in the terrain and is able to support, in case of 
necessity, the service support and combat service support needs of the military. Any 
potential way of advance by an aggressor is spotted by the 3,000 demolition points 
already in place and countless strong defensive positions.259  
The last features characterizing the military-prone Switzerland are the hobbies of 
its citizens, which are mandated to practice shooting while not on duty.260 For the Swiss 
people, shooting is like golf or fishing for other nations.261 It can be said that 
Switzerland, with its rough terrain, determined citizen-soldiers, and an economic 
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infrastructure pre-tailored to meet military demands in case of conflict, is always 
preparing for war; perhaps this is why they have enjoyed such long period of peace. 
C. THE NATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE MILITIA 
There are only a few Swiss military that are professional soldiers, and their main 
assignment is to keep the militia cohesive and accustomed to the way of war.262 What 
started in 1291 as an amalgam of independently raised militias from each canton is 
nowadays a federally organized army, supervised by a general staff and, in case of war, 
having appointed a unique Commander in Chief: the General.263 Historically, the Swiss 
militia functioned well organized along canton lines, and the regionally raised units 
performed well even without forming a nationwide cohesive body. The current 
centralized organization is due to the defeat they suffered at the hands of the French 
Army at the end of the seventeenth century;264 that fateful event uncovered other 
shortcomings of the Swiss militia, such as the outdated character of their tactics and 
equipment, as well their weakness in the face of hostile propaganda. Thus, beginning in 
1874, Article 18 of the Swiss constitution regulates the functioning of the militia in a 
centralized federal system and appoints the country as responsible for issuing “the first 
equipment, clothing, and arms without payment”265 for every serviceman. Realizing that 
their previous battlefield innovations dated from the Middle Ages,266 the Swiss started 
designing high-quality weapons, so their militia would never be outfought by another 
army on Swiss soil.267 From the standard-issue rifle to the high-end fighter jets of the air 
force, Switzerland equips its armed forces with considerably advanced weapon systems. 
262 McPhee, La Place de la Concorde, 12. 
263 Ibid., 12, 62. 
264 Halbrook, Target Switzerland, 15, 17. 
265 Ibid., 17. 
266 McPhee, La Place de la Concorde, 49; the Helvetic militia introduced the pike and pike column 
tactics, as well as the Morgenstern and the Lucerne hammer, weapons able to penetrate through the mail 
armor of the feudal knights. 
267 Halbrook, Target Switzerland, 18, 42, 242‒245; the Model 1911 rifle of World War I, the K 31 of 
WW II, and the newer design weapons manufactured in Switzerland by SIG-Sauer, Brugger-Thomet, 
Hamerli, and others are just few examples of the Swiss continuous preoccupation with firearms 
development; Switzerland is one of the top 15 weapons manufacturer selling small arms 
(http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php). 
 59 
                                                 
D. THE USE OF PRE-EXISTING SKILLS 
There are two ways in which the Swiss Army employs the skills acquired by its 
citizens outside the defense establishment: appropriate assignments of the personnel, 
according to the aptitudes he/she developed in daily civilian life;268 and the enforcement 
of rifle-shooting as a compulsory national sport and contest.269  
The Swiss military is considered to mirror the society, meaning that pre-existing 
leadership and specialized aptitudes of a soldier are considered when he or she is 
appointed to his/her military position. The Swiss banking system is said to compensate 
for the lack of formal superior military education structures. “Swiss banks are the 
counterpart of West Point,”270 as McPhee states, and it is a common fact that most of the 
high-ranking banking officials retain military leadership positions, and superior officers 
from the militia hold leadership positions in civilian companies.271 Other civilian 
occupations also match the military ones, as is the case for medics, veterinarians, horse 
conductors, drivers, mechanics, pilots, and so on.272 
As for the shooting training, it is not just a sport. It is a mandatory national sport, 
and the Swiss Shooting Federation serves as the backbone of the armed citizenry, every 
Swiss must be involved in marksmanship activities until the age of 40.273 There is one 
annual shooting festival held in various locations simultaneously, and countless cantonal 
or local shooting matches, capped by the federal shooting festival every five years, which 
is by far the greatest shooting festival in the world.274 Due to the large number of 
shooting ranges, the familiarity between the shooter and his rifle, and the efforts made by 
the military to issue user-friendly shooting training handbooks that are religiously used 
by the Swiss citizens, marksmanship has become a common skill of the average 
268 Halbrook, Target Switzerland, 225. 
269 McPhee, La Place de la Concorde, 93. 
270 Ibid., 63. 
271 Ibid., 56, 57. 
272 Ibid., 121. 
273 Halbrook, Target Switzerland, 26. 
274 Ibid., 242; See also http://smith-wessonforum.com/lounge/145345-worlds-biggest-shooting-
competition-pic-heavy-not-56k-modems.html. 
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civilian.275 Continuous practice with the army-issued rifle makes the Swiss soldier very 
efficient in shooting at distances ranging between 50 to 300 or 400 meters, and even more 
in favorable conditions.276  
E. OTHER INFLUENCING FACTORS 
There are particular conditions that influence the deterrent capabilities of 
Switzerland, so obviously underscored by the seven centuries of little fighting.277 First, 
its geography is highly advantageous for the defender; next, the accommodation of the 
Swiss citizen to hardship, and the reckless determination to resist by all means, death 
being preferred to losing their freedom, make Switzerland a special case in the world of 
nations. Their mobilization system has remained effective through time, and the Swiss 
know how to organize themselves in such a manner that gives their army a high readiness 
status. The military service is tailored to the nation’s needs, and the nation evolved along 
a defense-centered approach. Worth mentioning is the Swiss ability to develop the proper 
tools they might need in their fights, and the special affection they show for them. From 
the medieval weapons that defeated the mounted feudal knights from the position of 
dominance they held over the battlefield, to the current small arms industry that makes 
every Swiss soldier a marksman, Switzerland has maintained a weapons industry of the 
best kind. 
Finally, the Swiss constitution and international treaties establish Switzerland in a 
permanent neutrality status necessary to enable diplomatic relations between belligerents 
in case of hostilities and diplomatic breakdowns. 
275 Halbrook, Target Switzerland, 26. 
276 Ibid., 27. 
277 McPhee, La Place de la Concorde, 13. Since this period of no conquest of Switzerland was briefly 
interrupted during the Napoleonic wars, the Swiss still continue to claim that it was at least a period of 
freedom. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
The militia army of Switzerland, far from being protected from external 
aggressions, forged its status as a formidable opponent that, since 1515, deterred any 
invasion of the country by a foreign power, except for Napoleon’s Revolutionary France. 
Charles Oman regarded Switzerland as the example of a small nation achieving military 
dominance through a “good military organization, and a sound system of national 
tactics,”278 but it took the lesson of Marignano to understand that even the soundest 
tactics need refinement. Later, during the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars, 
Switzerland was occupied by the Grande Armėe, which resorted to psychological warfare 
and succeeded in disuniting the Swiss people, thus easing the access of the invading force 
inside the national mountain fortress. This taught the Swiss a lesson that encouraged them 
to unify the national militia, and to develop propaganda countermeasures. As it was seen 
during the First and Second World Wars, Switzerland succeeded in deterring any 
invasion attempts by the totalitarian powers surrounding it. 
The Swiss military is a militia army that equals or betters the readiness and 
reaction time of any standing military. By employing a defense system tailored around 
the defense-friendly geography of the country, and maintaining a strong determination of 
the Swiss people to train, in order to be always ready to defend themselves, Switzerland 
makes the best use of the resources it has. It is considered that the militia character of the 
military played a major role in the preparedness of Switzerland to repel an invasion 
during the two world wars of the twentieth century; for the Swiss, the whole amount of 
money could had been directed to training and equipping the militia, as opposed to the 
case of Holland or Belgium, which despite spending double the amount, were unable to 
mount a credible defense.279 
278 Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, 76. 
279 Halbrook, Target Switzerland, 35–37. 
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Although there are a series of specific conditions that make the Swiss case 
particular, those were achieved in time through adhering to the principle of armed 
neutrality, defiance of chivalry during fighting, and stubborn determination in defending 
their core values: freedom and democracy.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter of the research provides the conclusions resulting from the analysis 
of the features of the militia forces presented in the three case studies. It will begin with a 
re-evaluation of the findings related to the national militia hub-and-spoke concept, 
encompassing the components unfolded after the investigation of the cases, as depicted in 
Table 2. 
Table 2.   National militia radial structure 

















































































Primary category Conceptual militia        
Study cases 
Overmountain men        
Tory militia        
1968 IDF        
1973 IDF        
Pre-1800 Swiss 
militia        
Post-Napoleon 
Swiss Army        
 
In the second part, the relevance of the pre-existing civilian skills as a resource for 
national defense will be addressed. Finally, the relevance of a militia-based defense 
option will be considered, in the face of the recent political and military developments 
occurring in Eastern Europe and leading to this date to the attempts of several eastern 
Ukrainian regions to claim autonomy from Kiev and seek annexation to Russia. 
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A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In the following paragraphs, we review the findings of our examination of the 
presented cases, including the performance of militias and their relationship with their 
communities, their relationship to a central authority, and the manner in which they are 
trained and equipped. 
1. Militia Identifies with the Community, and its Performance Level 
Increases with the Threat Perceived  
In all of the presented cases, the problem of representing the community was 
encountered at least once. The conflict between Rebels and the Tory militia in the first 
case, between the Haganah (later IDF) and other militant organizations (Irgun and Lehi 
on the Jewish side, and the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas on the Arab 
side) in Israel, and the dissent sowed by revolutionary propaganda in the French-speaking 
cantons of Switzerland, all tested the strength of the militia system.  
In the first case, the Rebels identified themselves with the American settlers’ 
community, while the Tory militia harbored a British image which, although representing 
only a fraction of the population, was powerful enough to instill obedience in the 
population, fear in their opponents, and confidence in themselves. While the Tories 
perceived their foes as mere “mongrels” provoking minor troubles, and the Continental 
Army as the real threat they should face, the Rebels saw in Ferguson’s militia a deadly 
threat to their lives; therefore, it was enough for them to acknowledge the presence of 
hostile Redcoats in their area, and they decided to act. This was the only threat perceived 
by the ‘overmountain men’ community, yet it motivated them strongly enough to equal, 
at least, the indoctrination and training of the Tory militia. 
The Israeli case brings additional data to this variable, since the isolation of the 
Jewish community among different hostile ethnic populations had the effect of keeping 
them together. Starting with the defense of the kibutzim in the emerging Israel, the 
Israelis constantly identified the IDF with their country, nation, and society, and the 
military reacted in the same way. This was not the case for Irgun and Lehi which, 
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although very active in the public media, could not gain enough popular support to 
replace the IDF in people’s minds. 
In the Swiss case, ideas of freedom, democracy, and mutual dependence provided 
enough rationale to keep the nation together and the militia effect efficient, until they 
encountered the French revolutionary propaganda. The French-speaking cantons gave up 
the whole national edifice for nationalist and proletarian ideals, in the face of which the 
Swiss porcupine-defense was helpless. This was not the case in the first and second world 
conflagrations, where effective Swiss counter-propaganda deemed useless the German 
attempts to gain any benefits of having a major co-national group in neighboring 
Switzerland.  
Thus, one can conclude that militia usually identifies itself with the community, 
which adds to the milita’s fighting efficiency, but in the absence of an ideological or 
other form of political education, the militia is susceptible to psychological warfare. 
2. National-Level Authority, Manning, Training, and Equipping 
The authority of central government over the militia has several aspects. For our 
purpose here, in the following paragraphs we will consider the whole authority spectrum 
divided in two: the “chain of command” and the “administrative” sections of it. 
a. Command, Control, and Decision-Making Authority 
Far from being always considered as a formal command authority relationship, all 
the cases feature an overarching national framework providing guidance for the militia 
groups to act. This variable varies within and across cases, and will be discussed further. 
Beginning with the Rebel militia, the formal national-level command relationship 
was almost nonexistent. The unconventionally fighting rebels acknowledged the 
existence of a national body representing their interest, and therefore joined the cause 
animated by their revolutionary sentiments. However, they sought to correlate their 
actions with the national-level efforts, regardless of their totally unofficial involvement in 
the hostilities. By formally recognizing Nathanael Greene as their official superior, the 
Rebels embedded themselves in the Revolutionary body, even if only for seeking 
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legitimacy, if not for political considerations alone. Nevertheless, they would 
undoubtedly perform at the same level or better under national command, as was proved 
by Greene’s campaign in the South, which eventually helped bring total defeat to 
Cornwallis’ army. Worth mentioning is the independence of each rebel during the fight, 
which was unheard of in the British Army. Officers were near useless once fighting broke 
out on the rebel side, but badly needed by the Redcoats. Unfortunately for Ferguson’s 
militia, this permanent need of supervision from officers impeded the efficiency of the 
Tories, as soon as officers were targeted by rebel sharpshooters; furthermore, their 
inaccurate image of the battlefield led them to miss tactical opportunities several times. 
Moving to the Swiss cantons, it is well-known that they fought and trained in a 
decentralized manner, until their patterned pike-column tactics were overcome on the 
battlefield. Centuries later, when they built their “porcupine” strategy as a deterrent to 
external aggression, the Swiss recognized the benefits of a unified command. Between 
the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War, the Swiss Federation adopted a unique 
command for their federal militia and established a clear command and control system 
that would answer the coordination needs of the fighting force. Through training, the 
Swiss militia acts today as a disciplined professional army, but eventually the decision 
can be taken at the lowest level, which is the soldier. Even in contingencies, the Swiss are 
prepared to fight “to the last bullet, and then with the bayonet,” knowing that this way 
they are buying valuable time for the militia mustering inside the National Redoubt. 
A similar trait can be observed in the Israeli command and control system, with 
an emphasis on the battalion and brigade level, which are designed and trained to fight in 
conjunction with other elements as combined arms. The centralized command of the IDF 
provided the infrastructure that allowed the recruiting and training, when necessary, of 
the militia; moreover, after gaining the independence of Israel, the centralized command 
provided the operational insight for envisioning rapid deployment of the forces using 
interior lines of communications between simultaneously active fronts. Although having 
visible effects during the Arab-Israeli wars, the centralized command brought its most 
important contribution to the Israeli people during the underground, unconventional-
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fighting era and the independence war, periods in which it made the difference between 
winning and losing, since their opponents lacked unity. 
Hence, the three cases provide evidence of a positive relation between the 
national-level command of the militia, and the outcomes of the violent engagement. All 
things being equal, or even when fighting in inferiority, the militia prevailed under 
national-level command, but with decentralized decision-making authority. Another 
aspect emerging from the analysis of the three cases shows that militia units performed 
better when they were employed not in conjunction with a traditional standing military. 
This is outlined by the Israeli decision to designate the militia (the reserve component of 
the IDF) as the main element of the national defense, but it also can be observed in other 
instances, like in the early Swiss military history, or later in the U.S.280 
b. Manning, Training, and Equipping the Militia 
In the same manner as in the previous paragraph, there is an obvious trend of 
improved militia performance once the burden of training and equipping the militia was 
assumed at the national level, as shown in the examples of the Swiss military and the 
IDF. However, the use of the rifle and the pike were introduced by elements that were 
neither trained, nor equipped by a superior authority. These might rather suggest that 
scarcity of conventional equipment, augmented by deep knowledge of the opponent’s 
traditional way of fighting, enabled both the American rebels and the Swiss herdsmen to 
seek and find solutions that proved viable and cheap, and that fundamentally changed, or 
prepared to change the battlefield. Further developing this argument, it seems that there is 
a culminating point where the centralization of training and equipping responsibilities at 
280 At Morgartern, the invading Austrian forces numbered a substantial body of infantry, including 
Swiss contingents from the neighboring cantons, but their mounted mailed feudal knights were placed in 
front, according to traditional warfare rules of the epoch; the same military thinking assigned the knights 
the “honor” of attacking first in later battles, until the decision to dismount them was made, but the militia 
infantry was still considered as a second option, not worthy enough to bear the responsibility of the fight. 
(Oman, in The Art of War, 89, 91, 93; Rappard, Collective Security, 5). A similar tendency of overlooking 
the militia potential and their ability to fight unconventionally on their own soil can be observed during the 
American Civil War (1861‒1865); despite the advantageous position given by the defending posture of the 
South, and the steady positive outcomes of the unconventional engagements conducted by the generals in 
the Western theatre of operations, Robert E. Lee insisted on applying a traditional Napoleonic strategy in 
the North, and eventually lost the war (Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United 
States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 92–127). 
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the national level becomes counter-productive, as was the case for the Tory militia 
mustered by Patrick Ferguson.281 Therefore, it can be considered that centralized 
administration of the militia has a beneficial effect, but it can also have an adverse effect, 
if responsibilities are taken by traditionalist “crypto-militarists,” as General Palmer would 
describe with one word the inability of military planners to understand how a citizen 
army functions.282 As it will be described in the following section, there are adequate 
solutions for training and equipping the militia, and they can lead to superior efficiency 
on the battlefield, despite the character of the war the militia prepares for. 
B. THE USE OF PRE-EXISTING SKILLS 
The first case presented in this thesis introduced the use of personal hunting rifles 
by the American rebels to defeat a traditionally trained and equipped formation, superior 
in numbers, and perceived as more properly equipped for fight. However, the outcome of 
the battle proved the contrary, as the rebel militia had the liberty of using their hunting 
weapons, which they were proficient with. Thus, their mastery in using hunting rifles 
found a proper role in the non-traditional tactic chosen by the rebel leaders, and they 
prevailed at King’s Mountain and beyond. 
With the exception of the Swiss pike-column tactics, the later cases do not 
resemble similar situations, as the battlefield homogenously evolved into mechanized 
warfare; in these later cases, Switzerland and Israel focused on maintaining large, highly 
trained militias as the defense solution. Although the background of the two countries 
differs drastically—since the Swiss are renowned marksmen, while Israel had no military 
tradition, and its citizens do not usually carry weapons—in both cases they introduced 
pre-military training programs, with Israel’s being more comprehensive than the Swiss 
one. Hence, this particular variable, although initially considered as part under the 
overarching “training” spoke of the militia concept, became two-fold: under normal 
circumstances, militia performance improves with the increase in the use of pre-existing 
skills, which are usually “imported” directly from the civilian occupation of the 
281 Dameron, King’s Mountain, 53. 
282 Holley, General Palmer, 98. 
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militiamen, or developed through training outside the military service. Under specific 
circumstances, such was the case of introducing the pike versus the mailed knights, or the 
rifle against the musket, pre-existing civilian skills can become game-changers in the 
military domain. In the first instance, the rationale advocating for the militia to the 
detriment of the standing traditional military is cost related. As asserted by Halbrook,283 
military expenditures are less relevant when analyzing a militia versus a standing army, 
since for the militia all the expenses are directed to training and equipment. In the other 
case, they will have to cover additional costs, such as the full-time pay, barracks, and 
others. Both Switzerland and Israel take full advantage of advertising their high regard 
for military training, as well as the symbiotic relationship between the military 
capabilities and the civil society’s ability to support a large defense body. Although 
neither one of the two is offering accurate details regarding their defense expenditures, 
their claims are supported by past experiences, such as the manner in which Israel 
performed during the last wars, and the unusual amount of military-applicable 
recreational activities present everywhere in Switzerland. These performances could be 
replicated by similar standing armies, but the cost could prove unbearable for the 
economy. 
The second instance, which addresses the introduction of rather revolutionary, 
innovative elements on the battlefield, is even more intriguing. Despite the normal 
expectations, history shows that revolutionary changes in the military domain do not 
come exclusively from the defense research laboratories, but sometimes from common, 
daily practice. A second look at Table 1 reveals the potential use of pre-existing skills 
across the range of missions currently defined for the U.S. military, which will reiterate 
the broad applicability of civilian skills in defense-related activities, or missions; in this 
case, common sense may suggest that a civilian performing a specific duty in a 
competitive environment for extended periods of time will be more efficient in that 
specific field than a soldier accustomed to it as a second, contingency-related skill. 
283 Halbrook, Target Switzerland, 36. For the selected year 1934–1935, the military expenditures of 
Belgium and Holland were significantly higher than those of Switzerland; the author considers their 
spending as modeled on a World War I approach, but this impediment may be shadowed by the fact that all 
countries used the same model at that time.  
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Moreover, the last section of the table, “major operations and campaigns,” seemed 
initially reserved for the standing militaries, since civilians might prefer to continue with 
their routines. The case studies showed this idea to be wrong, and the citizen soldiers 
proved to be a redoubtable defense resource, if properly trained and employed. 
C. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
We began this research trying to learn whether a militia-based approach may be a 
viable option for the national defense of a nation-state, and through the case studies, we 
found plenty of evidence supporting the effectiveness of this option for a neutral country, 
as well as for an openly threatened one, such as Israel. So it happened that the time period 
dedicated for this research coincided with the confusing events that occurred in Ukraine 
at the beginning of 2014, reaffirming the irrelevance of a standing military when required 
to handle an unconventional aggression. However, events in Ukraine are neither over, nor 
are they outlining anything else than the impotence of a “standing” military. 
Undoubtedly, a high-readiness militia could provide better coverage of the national 
territory, but it could also become an armed opposition for the central authority, if the 
other elements identified here as enhancing the militia ability to withstand external, as 
well as internal threats, are not present. 
Militia systems such as the Israeli, the Swiss, or the U.S. National Guard, are the 
result of long years of trial-and-error policy, and cannot be devised overnight. Properly 
maintained and updated, they fulfill national defense goals; they provide returns in terms 
of increasing cohesiveness of the population, and reduce the vulnerability of the latter to 
destabilizing agents. As long as it is regarded as the main defense asset of the nation, the 
militia will not be under resourced, for the benefit of a potentially present standing 
component of the military. This way, the nation can benefit by having a viable defense 
structure, while maintaining an active component for additional duties. 
Taking one step beyond the conventional thinking, one might hypothesize the 
time for a revolution in military affairs along militia lines has come, and defense concepts 
as we understand them today are on the verge of becoming irrelevant. In this case, it 
should not come as a surprise that the use of unexpected skills will bring obsolescence to 
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the symbols of today’s sheer military might, such as the aircraft carrier, the jet fighter, or 
the tank, and warfare may continue to retain a “low intensity” or “unconventional” 
character, due to the low probability of conventional survival in a conventional, force-on-
force, military engagement. In such a world, militias may come to matter a great deal. 
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